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Introduction
Peter A. Dutton and Ryan D. Martinson

T

his volume is the product of a groundbreaking dialogue on sea-lane security held
between People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and U.S. Navy scholars at the Naval
War College in August 2013, with additional material from a related conference, “China’s
Far Seas Operations,” hosted by the China Maritime Studies Institute in May 2012. At
that time the political climate in China was uncertain, in the shadow of the Bo Xilai
crisis and of the impending transition of power between the Hu and Xi regimes; accordingly the PLA Navy, though invited to participate in the “Far Seas” conference, ultimately declined to do so. This was not entirely surprising. Attempts by various agencies of
the U.S. Navy up to that time to engage in discussions to advance maritime cooperation
between China and the United States had been met with lukewarm responses at best. But
at a maritime security dialogue in Dalian in September 2012 Senior Capt. Zhang Junshe
of the PLA Navy Research Institute, a key contributor to this volume and to the success
of the academic cooperation between our two institutes, approached Peter Dutton to
tell him that everything had changed. China’s new leadership wanted the PLA Navy to
engage the U.S. Navy actively and to discuss openly all relevant issues, with the aim of
advancing cooperation between the two navies. Since that time members of the China
Maritime Studies Institute have engaged members of the PLA Navy Research Institute in
discussions on a rich variety of maritime topics, leading to advances in understanding
between our two institutes and our two navies.
Much has been written about Chinese sea power in the “near seas” of East Asia—those
waters located within the chain of islands extending from the Kurils in the north to
Sumatra in the south.1 This volume attempts to broaden the discussion by examining
China’s efforts to shape its navy to meet new and growing needs beyond Asia, in waters
to which it usually refers as the “far seas,” or “distant seas.”2 Remote from domestic bases
of support, the far seas impose a range of logistical and operational challenges on the
PLA Navy. But this distance from the Chinese homeland also provides new opportunities for cooperation with the other navies of the world, creating a much-needed antidote
to the growing tensions east of Malacca.
The five missions of the China Maritime Studies Institute—to research, write, advise,
teach, and engage—were all advanced through this exchange of scholarship, but none
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more so than the engagement portion of its portfolio. The institute engages with the
PLA Navy for the purpose of providing the Chief of Naval Operations with an additional pathway to improve the U.S. Navy’s understanding of PLA Navy perspectives. The
exchange that forms the basis of this volume was rich. Although that exchange cannot
be captured in this brief introduction in all its aspects, there are several themes that
the papers published here capture especially well. Every author, for instance, takes for
granted that a redistribution of power is ongoing that could have profoundly negative
consequences for sea-lane security if not carefully managed. Additionally, although there
is general agreement that the U.S. Navy will remain dominant in terms of traditional security, it is broadly accepted that the shrinking size of its fleet means it will increasingly
need support in stabilizing the global maritime domain from the effects of nontraditional security threats. Finally, there is a general consensus that cooperative U.S.-Chinese
naval relations could serve as a basis for improvements not only in maritime security but
also in the overall relationship between the United States and China.
To that end, Dale Rielage begins this volume by reflecting on some of the deepest questions facing the U.S. Navy. He assesses that the aforementioned global redistribution of
power is brought about primarily by the rise of China rather than any American decline
but that nonetheless this redistribution of power has the potential to affect sea-lane security. One major factor in China’s growing power is the expansion of its maritime trade,
which is dependent on sea-lane security. However, Rielage notes, as power transfers and
diffuses among states, maritime trade ironically becomes a vulnerability, in that shipping
presents an increasingly attractive target if power shifts lead to conflict. Additionally, the
same diffusion of technology that accompanies advances in maritime trade also increases access to technology that can be used to deny use of the seas. Rielage concludes that
dealing with the inevitable mistrust between the United States and China in the midst of
power change and the PLA Navy’s improving capacity is one of the major challenges of
our age. To avoid the problems of misperception, he recommends regular communication between navies, maintenance and development of the international legal system,
and the development of mechanisms for collective action to support sea-lane security.
Wu Zhengyu’s chapter advances the theme of maritime competition introduced by
Rielage and focuses attention on the impact of China’s maritime development on strategic stability in East Asia. He observes lessons from the previous experiences of similarly
situated states in terms of geographical position—that is, states with hybrid land and
maritime interests, such as France and Germany, and a large continental state that chose
to build maritime power, the Soviet Union. He observes that for many years China’s
maritime deficiency was an important component of strategic stability in Asia, because
there was a natural balance of power and interests between China as a strong continental
state and the United States and its maritime allies. However, the recent growth of China’s
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navy and the development of antiaccess capabilities has upset this balance. Wu observes
that to ensure its long-term safety and security China must find an appropriate balance
between land and sea power to avoid antagonizing the United States as Beijing pursues
its territorial, economic, and security interests in its surrounding seas.
Xu Qiyu is somewhat less concerned about the possibility of accelerating naval rivalry
and asserts instead that the historical record suggests that the maritime domain tends
not to be especially sensitive to power shifts in the international structure. In support of
this contention he observes that throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
even as Germany, France, and Russia vied for power on the European continent, Britain
remained the dominant maritime power. Xu concludes that the American position as
the dominant maritime power is secure for the foreseeable future but will not be without
challenges. A shrinking U.S. Navy will be especially ill prepared to cope with nontraditional security threats and will require cooperation from other naval powers. Xu is
optimistic that such multilateral naval cooperation will help to foster a cooperative, or at
least collaborative, model of great-power relations. American cooperation in this regard
assists China to overcome its own mistrust of U.S. intentions.
Andrew Erickson and Austin Strange and, in the succeeding essay, Zhang Junshe reflect
on the antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden as a successful example of Chinese
cooperation with the international community. Erickson and Strange observe that the
PLA Navy takes a cautious approach to the use of force but has become quite innovative
in performing the mission. They note that China’s initial preference for individual action
in coordination with others to perform the tasks associated with suppressing piracy has
gradually given way to more direct cooperation. Additionally, the Chinese have conducted a tremendous amount of international engagement through a wide array of port
visits. Zhang proudly recounts the PLA Navy’s accomplishments in the Gulf of Aden
since it first began antipiracy operations in 2008. Like Erickson and Strange, he argues
that the Chinese navy’s increasingly “close cooperation” with other navies, including
the U.S. Navy, has “promoted mutual understanding and mutual trust between the two
navies” and advanced “a new type of big power relationship between our two countries.”
Six years of antipiracy operations have not been without their challenges for the PLA
Navy. One such challenge is logistical support. Christopher Yung tells us that the Chinese are having a robust debate over the question of how to provide logistical support
to the PLA Navy’s increasing far-seas operations, especially in the Indian Ocean. He
assesses that the most logical, and therefore most likely, decision would be to establish
dual-use logistics facilities that can support both commercial and military operations.
He anticipates that such facilities will use local agents to tap into existing commercial
networks and commercial delivery services so as to provide an efficient method of moving required materiel. This model is attractive because dual-use logistics facilities have
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a small and light footprint, incur low political costs to China, and would not need to be
defended by the Chinese military.
Cai Penghong observes that China’s recent determination to expand and protect its
overseas interests reflects a significant break with the nation’s past internal and continental focuses. He observes that the expansion of China’s overseas interests is a natural
outcome of its economic rise and that disruption to important sea-lanes would threaten
China’s economic and political stability. At the same time, he expects China to face competition and pressure from the United States, especially in the western Pacific. China, he
asserts, should not back down under this pressure but should actively compete with the
United States, without resorting to war. The key that prevents escalation of competition
to conflict, Cai says, is that China’s overseas interests are, though important, not vital,
and that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, Cai believes, cooperative competition is the best strategic approach for China to take.
Jonathan Odom and Wang Xiaoxuan in their respective essays shift the focus of discussion to the rule sets that will best serve the interests of peace and stability in the maritime domain as both countries seek ways to manage competition and expand cooperation. Odom observes that China’s current approach to international law of the sea, an
approach that seeks to restrict military freedoms of navigation in the near seas, may
not serve Chinese interests well as China moves out into the far seas to undertake naval
operations there. Without liberalization of its restrictive approach to international law,
Odom argues, despite its growing capacity the PLA Navy risks remaining ineffective
at protecting its growing overseas resource and commercial interests and at protecting
Chinese citizens living abroad from the effects of political instability or natural disasters.
Accordingly, in Odom’s view, liberalizing its policies regarding freedom of navigation for
military purposes would best protect China’s interests. Wang seems to agree, to a point.
While he believes the international community should “establish the concept of freedom of the seas for all,” he is convinced that “self-interested and exclusive control”—a
reference, presumably, to American global naval dominance—is the “greatest threat” to
sea-lane security. Wang makes little mention of the maritime legal regime, asserting only
that the system needs to be improved to support the management of the global maritime
environment. Wang’s solution is based more on power sharing: joint management of sealanes, cooperative international support for sea-lane navigation systems, and an open
conversation among coastal states, user states, and maritime powers. Note the difference
between the American preference for regulating international behaviors (strengthening
rules and laws) and the Chinese preference (strengthening relationships). This is a recurring theme not just in this volume but in many bilateral discussions between the two
navies.

beyond the wall

5

Finally, Mark Redden and Phillip Saunders round out the volume with a substantial
chapter that tackles the competition/cooperation dynamic in the United States–China
relationship at sea. Redden and Saunders circle back to a theme that the beginning
chapters address—that if the U.S. Navy and the PLA Navy are able to improve bilateral cooperation substantially, it will have “a significant positive impact on the broader
relationship.” They are pessimistic about the bilateral talks under the Military Maritime
Consultative Agreement, because the United States focuses on “tactical-level deconfliction procedures” while China seeks to address “broader political-military issues.” (This
is the rules/relationship dichotomy returning for a curtain call.) Using this framework,
Redden and Saunders address the two perspectives regarding military operations in the
exclusive economic zone. They conclude that for the time being the difference between
them causes friction but at a manageable level, below a threshold of maximum acceptable operational risk. However, Redden and Saunders are not optimistic that this
condition will continue indefinitely and conclude that ultimately “U.S. and Chinese . . .
maritime interactions will help shape broader rules and norms of maritime behavior.”
Perhaps, after all, this is the point of continued direct engagement between the U.S. Navy
and the PLA Navy. If China’s power continues to rise in the future as it has in recent decades, the history of the twenty-first century will be written in terms of the cooperation
or competition between the two powerful states whose interests these navies will have
defended. The United States and China will either develop a common approach to maritime security or slip farther toward competition and probably even into conflict. If we
hope to avoid the latter future, active, sustained, patient engagement will be required to
develop either mutually agreeable rule sets or an improved relationship. As one Chinese
participant noted during the conference, a new type of great-power relationship would
mean “something completely new, very different from the old US-USSR relationship,
but also different from the US-UK relationship. It is a new path that will require more
cooperation, understanding, and the development of mutual trust for China and the US
to move toward a common goal. The bottom line is that it is like a friendship.” These are
lofty words, and indeed the chapters in this volume make clear that both American and
Chinese naval experts desire a relationship defined more by cooperation than by competition. The question that remains to be answered, however, is: On what terms?

Notes
1. Peter Dutton, Andrew S. Erickson, and Ryan
Martinson, eds., China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities, China Maritime Study 11 (Newport, R.I.:
Naval War College Press, 2014).

2. Nan Li, “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy
and Capabilities: From ‘Near Coast’ and ‘Near
Seas’ to ‘Far Seas,’” Asian Security 5, no. 2 (2009),
pp. 144–69.

C HAPTER O N E

Multipolarity and the Future of Sea-Lane Security
Dale C. Rielage

T

he trend toward multipolarity represents a significant shift in the balance of power
across the international order. It is a fundamental factor that both the United States
and China are contemplating as they consider the future. The development of a multipolar global system has become accepted fact among U.S. government leaders. In the most
recent National Military Strategy, published in 2011, the Department of Defense did not
use the word “multipolar” but noted that “changing distribution of power” foretold an
“evolution to a ‘multi-nodal’ world.”1
The Chinese government has apparently arrived at a similar conclusion. Its 2013 defense
white paper states that “global trends toward economic globalization and multi-polarity
are intensifying.”2 In January 2013, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) deputy chief of
the General Staff, Lt. Gen. Qi Jianguo, wrote that “the process of multi-polarity is accelerating.” In outlining China’s future security environment, General Qi observed that
“the end of the Cold War opened up a new process of global multi-polarity . . . and the
era where one or two great powers ruled the world should be over and will never return.
This is an irreversible historical trend.”3
True multipolarity, if it comes to pass, would affect the international security environment in many ways. In the maritime domain, a more variegated distribution of power
could potentially impact the system of maritime communications that we have taken
for granted since the end of World War II. Would such change have a net positive or
net negative effect on sea-lane security? What key factors affecting positive or negative
change can be identified, and how might they be emphasized or mitigated the better to
safeguard sea-lane security?
Two points of context deserve mention. First, a shift to multipolarity does not necessarily mean an absolute decline in the resources or capabilities of the existing powers. In
its 2012 report “Global Trends 2030,” the National Intelligence Council aptly referred
to multipolarity as a “diffusion of power.”4 If in most cases decline is relative rather than
absolute, today’s powers will likely remain prosperous and capable of consequential action at home and abroad. They will, however, face an increasing number of other states
that share this ability. In our future world, very few capabilities will be exclusive to any
one nation.
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Second, the question of sea-lane security in a multipolar world must be placed in the
context of increasing global dependence on maritime trade. Five hundred years ago the
approximately thousand vessels trading among the Baltic and Scandinavian states had
a total load capacity of about ninety thousand tons. Today, that amount of cargo is offloaded in the United States from China every sixty-five minutes and could fit comfortably in a single very large containership.5 In the postwar period, worldwide trade volume
has increased an average of 6 percent annually.6 Economic globalization has allowed
hundreds of millions of people to participate in complex economic transactions beyond
their local markets, spreading more widely the benefits, costs, and impacts of commerce.
The aggregate effect has been a striking increase in the average standard of living. Moreover, increased trade has led to growing global economic integration, which has very
important security implications.
Indeed, there is an interesting cause-and-effect question here. Did stable access to the
sea-lanes underwrite the economic boom that has driven the trend toward multipolarity,
or do growing powers naturally turn to maritime trade? Whether cause or effect, growing use of the seas is not an adjunct to political multipolarity. The diffusion of power
that creates multipolarity is in part diffusion of economic power. That diffusion is based
on a global trading system that must be fueled by raw materials and must move finished
goods to market.
Assuming that multipolarity is built on trade and that trade is built on sea-lane security,
the fundamental question becomes: Is multipolarity self-limiting? Will the system at
some point threaten one of its core enablers, killing the goose that laid the golden egg?
To answer this question, we need to identify the chief threats to global maritime trade
and examine how multipolarity may impact them. These threats can be grouped into
three major categories. First, and most significant, is the possibility of transregional
conflict. Transregional conflict most commonly involves conflict between great powers, though conflict between significant and distributed coalitions can have the same
characteristics. These conflicts spread outside their immediate neighborhoods and often
lead to catastrophic disruption of the international trade system. Examples of this type
include the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II. When these conflicts
ended, the reconstituted trading system profoundly differed from what had existed
before.
Second, use of the sea-lanes is threatened by the much more likely prospect of regional
conflict. This involves geographically limited contests between regional states (for example, the War of the Pacific, between Chile and a coalition of Bolivia and Peru) or between a great power and a regional state, such as that between the United States and Iran
in 1987 and 1988. In these cases, impact on trade is tied to geography. If the regional
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conflict occurs in a key area, a crossroads on the global commons, the local disruption of
trade and resource flows can impact the wider system.
Finally, a variety of what we refer to as “nontraditional threats” can complicate or restrict
use of the sea-lanes. These include piracy, terrorism from the seas, and criminal activity.
How then is the trend toward multipolarity—or, in other terms, the diffusion of power—
likely to impact each of these threats?
Transregional conflict is a high-impact, low-probability event. It is important to recognize that neither multipolar political structure nor economic interdependence is a
complete antidote to great-power conflict. The European powers entered the twentieth
century having achieved a level of economic and cultural interconnection that would
make major war devastating for all the societies involved. They recognized this reality
and elected war regardless. In some cases, in fact, the war plans of the European powers
sought to leverage the economic system as a weapon in their struggle. Owing to their
scale and extent, transregional conflicts jeopardize the viability and structure of the political and economic system itself. Thus, when hostilities cease the players and the rules
of the system are invariably altered, though in most cases the system endures.
The presence of several large powers or of multiple alliances in competition increases
the chances of a conflict extending beyond a region and potentially across the globe. As
John Mearsheimer observes, “there are more great powers in a multipolar system and
therefore more opportunities for great powers to fight each other.”7 With an increased
probability of alliance ties crossing regions, the prospect of geographic escalation of
conflict becomes acute.
Regional conflict is the most likely and most dangerous threat to sea-lane security. Ironically, the increasing importance of international trade makes that trade an ever more
attractive target. The same diffusion of technology that allows more states to produce
goods and to use the seas for their economic gain also increases access to the technology to deny use of the seas. Recently, in the United States we have begun referring to
these technologies collectively as “antiaccess/area-denial” weapons systems. The concept
behind these systems is quite old. Technology, however, has in many cases increased
their effectiveness and increased their ease of employment, removing practical barriers to their use. Global trade has made these technologies more widely available. Thus,
in a multipolar world a state is more likely to find freedom of navigation in its region
militarily significant, to possess the means to impact it, and to decide to employ them in
wartime.
Nontraditional threats constitute the third category of threats to sea-lane security.
Referring to these issues as “nontraditional” is an interesting comment on our current
international order—viewed across the centuries, piracy and other criminal actions at
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sea are perhaps the most traditional threats to the sea-lanes. In recent years, these threats
have taken new forms. However, at most they can only complicate or restrict our use of
the sea-lanes; they cannot deny maritime commerce across a broad area. In most cases,
they represent friction within the international maritime system and not threats to its
operation. The nonstate actors who carry out these acts are facilitated either by a breakdown in governance ashore—providing havens for piracy and other criminal activity—
or, more rarely, by the willful assistance of functioning governments. In most cases, the
limited resources and level of sophistication of the attacks put answering them squarely
within the capability of most midrange powers.
The irony is that nontraditional threats—by far the least menacing of the three—are the
most likely to garner international cooperation. Diffusion of power increases the capacity of states to act against nontraditional threats, while the multipolar system and the
absence of a single security provider builds incentive for cooperative action.
To summarize, multipolarity increases the risks to sea-lane security from both trans
regional and regional conflicts but encourages low-cost cooperation against tertiary
threats to the system. What deliberate actions, then, can we take to mitigate the risks?
First, we can take measures to minimize the likelihood of naval rivalry between the leading powers. Several years ago, in a chapter of the book Twenty-First Century Seapower,
PLA colonel Xu Qiyu asked whether the emergence of a rising power necessarily leads
to a shift in the balance of power at sea.8 He concluded that it need not. In his paper for
this volume, he suggests that, similarly, the diffusion of power across the international
system does not necessarily mean a shift in the power structure at sea. I would agree that
a shift in power at sea is not an absolute rule; however, the dynamics that accompany
multipolarity make a shift in maritime power structures likely.
The question hinges on whether each of the major trading nations of the world believes
it needs a naval force sufficient to guarantee its access to the international sea-lanes. I believe that they do. As rising powers invest in new naval capabilities, they incite concern
that protection of trade does not reflect the full extent of their ambitions.
The current proliferation of antiaccess/area-denial weapons, mentioned above, makes
this calculus more complex. A nation that seeks to guarantee access to the sea-lanes inherently needs the capability to defeat such weapons. That capability, however, is agnostic—that is, it can be perceived as defending peaceful commerce and enabling aggressive
action. This technological dynamic encourages competition.
The technology that drives this phenomenon is unlikely to change radically in the next
several years. Therefore, preventing naval rivalry is ultimately a problem of perception.
Communication between navies is the first and foremost mechanism of shaping perception. These and other confidence-building measures are well worth exploring.
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Maintaining and developing the international legal system are collectively a second
important action. The current rules-based order has provided stability in the maritime
domain. Confidence in that regime reduces the incentive for nations to think of the
protection of their maritime interests as first and foremost a naval problem. Disputeresolution mechanisms offer some chance of binding, nonviolent settlement of maritime
disputes. Moreover, a broad respect for norms increases the chance of collective action
against violators, preventing maritime security from being a strictly “self-help” project.
This, however, is an area where the trend line is not promising. While the U.S. Navy
remains a firm advocate of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) as a codification of customary international law, the deep well of skepticism
in other parts of the American government has prevented its ratification. In the western
Pacific, the apparent refusal of China to state for its claims in the South China Sea a case
that is consistent with international law or to accept UNCLOS arbitration with the Philippines fosters a perception within the region that international law is not an effective
framework for resolving disputes. The second-order effects need to be countered.
Last, we can continue to develop mechanisms for collective action to support sea-lane
security. Aside from the intrinsic value of combating nontraditional threats, collective
action of this kind can contribute to traditional security by creating foundations for
cooperation. There have been some remarkable successes in this arena, but we should
continue to push what is possible. As Andrew Erickson has remarked, we need to
“transcend the lowest common denominator.” Time/space-coincident unilateral action,
as is often the case in the Gulf of Aden, is not true collective action. We also need to
consider whether the cooperation we have seen in the Gulf of Aden can transcend that
single region and problem or the success of the effort will spell the end of this maritime
cooperation. The relatively low level of capability required to contribute allows a broad
coalition. The United States, India, China, and Japan, as trading nations with established
or growing naval capacities, should show the way in this process.
In conclusion, true multipolarity, if it comes to pass, will create a world where ensuring
the security of the sea-lanes will require deliberate positive action by multiple selfinterested nations. It is certain to be a difficult task. It is, however, a compelling and
consequential task: our ability to maintain the security of the sea-lanes will determine
nothing less than whether the billions of people across the globe will be able to realize
their potentials in the years to come.

Notes
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C HAPTER TW O

Rimland Powers, Maritime Transformation, and Policy
Implications for China
Wu Zhengyu

M

aritime transformation stands out in history mainly for two reasons. First, history
seems to have been very unkind to such transformations. Except for a few ancient
cases, no effort at maritime transformation has ever succeeded. Serious attempts at maritime transformation by such great powers as Louis XIV’s France, Wilhelm II’s Germany,
and imperial Russia / the Soviet Union all failed. Second, maritime transformation
pursued by modern great powers has without exception led to strategic instability. In the
cases of Louis XIV and Wilhelm II, their pursuits ended in hegemonic wars. In the case
of imperial Russia / the Soviet Union, such efforts led to strategic tension and rivalry
with other great powers. In spite of these ominous precedents, the world is currently
witnessing another maritime transformation. This time, the protagonist is the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). Today, China’s turn toward the sea is very much a reality, as
evident in the stunning output of its shipbuilding industry, its vast and expanding merchant marine, its growing fishing fleet, and especially its increasingly modern navy.
Though maritime transformation is important in and of itself, to date there has been
little scholarship on the subject except for a series of separate case studies. Case studies are indispensable for good scholarship, but they mean little if efforts are not made
to identify patterns and extrapolate strategic lessons from the seemingly unique cases.
This paper intends to fill this gap by situating China’s maritime pursuit within a larger
context and drawing conclusions from historical precedents. It first defines maritime
transformation, expounds its significance, and points out qualitative differences among
the historical cases. The paper then introduces the “rimland” concept and explores the
mechanism that led to the historical failures of maritime transformation by the rimland
powers. Then, using these historical lessons, the paper clarifies the challenges posed to
the balance of power in East Asia by China’s pursuit of maritime capabilities. Finally,
the paper applies the historical lessons to China today and illustrates the strategic issues
that nation must seriously consider if it wants to escape the strategic traps in maritime
transformation.
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The Definition and Significance of Maritime Transformation
Maritime transformation is a tantalizingly fuzzy concept. Everyone seems to understand
it, but no one has satisfactorily explained its meaning. This concept seldom appears
in monographs on strategy, and the classics of strategy are conspicuously silent on
the topic. Today, with the rise of China in the nautical realm, more and more policy
analysts and academics have referred to this concept in a variety of analyses and studies.
However, almost no effort has been made to define it precisely, and most analysts and
academics on the subject have largely treated it as self-evident. In this paper, “maritime
transformation” as a strategic concept specifically refers to the process whereby a continental or coastal state shifts its general strategic orientation and systematically redirects
resources from land to the seas with the aim of transforming itself from a purely land
power to a land/sea hybrid.1
Though maritime transformation is a strategic rather than geographic concept, geography is an indispensable factor for it. Maritime transformation does not apply to such
states as Britain and Japan, which, largely due to geography, already have a maritime
orientation. Only continental or coastal states have the combination of geographic qualifications and strategic necessity to pursue maritime transformation. This explains why
the protagonists of maritime transformation throughout history are either continental
or coastal states. In theory, many indexes can be employed to evaluate whether a state is
pursuing maritime transformation. However, the most important index is the position
of the navy in the overall composition of a state’s armed forces. A relatively prominent
position indicates a shift in strategic concern from the terrestrial domain to the maritime domain. It also implies that the state can pursue maritime transformation purely for
political or strategic reasons, regardless of economic costs.2
If as a concept maritime transformation only recently began receiving attention in
the field of strategic studies, as a practice it can be traced as far back as ancient times.
Persia, Rome, and the Ottoman Empire, to name only the most prominent examples, all
pursued maritime transformation at the peak of their power. In general, their pursuits
revealed a continentalist approach to sea power, an approach that stands in marked
contrast to that of maritime powers in modern Europe. First, all three ancient empires
became dominant land powers first, after which, by devoting tremendous resources
to developing sea power, they were able to build substantial navies. Second, all three
ancient empires achieved command of the Mediterranean or the Arabian Sea, as the case
was, mainly by conquering the surrounding lands first. In view of this continentalist
approach to sea power, it is no wonder that Halford J. Mackinder invoked these ancient
examples to illustrate the inherent superiority of land power over sea power.3
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After the center of naval competition moved into the Atlantic and beyond, a few great
powers—France, Germany, and imperial Russia / the Soviet Union—seriously pursued
maritime transformation. Though historians of later times have been disposed to lump
all these cases together, there actually existed qualitative differences in terms of impacts
on strategic stability between France and Germany as the “rimland” powers and imperial
Russia / the Soviet Union as the “heartland” power. The maritime pursuits of imperial
Russia / the Soviet Union did not end in catastrophe, though they did lead to strategic
tension and rivalry. By contrast, the efforts of Louis XIV’s France and Wilhelm II’s Germany to achieve maritime transformation contributed much to hegemonic wars. Specifically, owing to their geographic situations, France and Germany can be land powers
or sea powers but not both simultaneously. Otherwise they would upset the European
balance of power, thus threatening the survival of other states.4
China, although located on the opposite side of Eurasia, is, like France and Germany, a
typical rimland power in geopolitical terms. For many centuries China was a continental
power, with a continentalist mentality, in spite of impressive maritime endowments and
an honorable maritime heritage.5 However, in the early part of the twenty-first century
China inaugurated vigorous efforts to achieve maritime transformation, efforts most
vividly evident in the exponential development of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
naval forces. China’s ongoing maritime transformation not only marks the redirection of
its overall strategic orientation from land to the sea but injects a brand-new factor into
the East Asian security environment.6 During the previous decades, China’s neighboring
countries (as well as the United States) had grown accustomed to accepting China as a
dominant land power in continental East Asia. However, the situation is changing now,
and no one can spell out its strategic implications with confidence.
As mentioned above, maritime transformation pursued by a rimland power tends to
have a more negative impact on regional strategic stability than that pursued by the
heartland power. In view of this, the prime challenge faced by China today is how to
avoid the potential strategic traps involved in maritime transformation, thereby to
achieve peaceful development. To achieve this objective, we need first to understand the
mechanism that led to the failures of maritime transformation pursued by past rimland
powers and, second, to clarify the challenges this pursuit will pose to the East Asian
regional security order.

Rimland Powers, Maritime Transformation, and the Balance of Power
To grasp the strategic implications of China’s maritime transformation, we need to begin
with the strategic significance of the rimland. After 1945, the dominance of the Cold
War in world politics disposed students of strategic studies to focus almost exclusively
on the heartland and ignore the strategic value of the rimland. Nevertheless, it is the
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rimland rather than the heartland that has been the political, economic, and strategic
center of gravity on the Eurasian continent since the sixteenth century. The states of the
rimland have been not merely more powerful than the heartland in terms of material
and human resources but also the sources of greatest concern to modern great powers. Its significance raises an important question: In modern history, why did maritime
transformations pursued by rimland powers (Louis XIV’s France and Wilhelm II’s
Germany) all end in failure? The key to this question lies in the intrinsic logic of the
European classical balance of power. This logic consists of two essential factors: the
intervention of the dominant maritime power and the grand coalition organized and led
by the dominant maritime power.
Throughout history, the supremacy of the dominant maritime power in the system has
rested on two pillars: maritime (especially naval) supremacy and the balance of power in
the core regions of Eurasia (Europe before 1945, Europe and East Asia now). These two
pillars are symbiotic, or interdependent. If the dominant maritime power hopes to keep
its overall supremacy in the system, it must have both in its favor.7 Halford J. Mackinder,
the most famous British political geographer in the twentieth century, once indicated
that to defeat an insular sea power, a land power had to meet two requirements: it had to
be unchallenged on land and had to possess sufficient resources to enable it to construct
a powerful fleet. Absent those two conditions, a strongly based insular sea power like
Britain would prevail, as evidenced by the British defeat of Napoleon’s France.8 Echoing
Mackinder’s reasoning, Nicholas J. Spykman, an American political scientist, believed
that the first line of defense for the United States lay in the preservation of a balance
of power in Europe and Asia. Spykman wrote that “the position of the United States in
regard to Europe as a whole” is identical to “the position of Great Britain in regard to the
European continent.” In light of this, “we have an interest in the European balance as the
British have an interest in the continental balance.”9
The implication of Mackinder’s and Spykman’s geopolitical reasoning is straightforward:
maritime supremacy and the balance of power in the core regions of Eurasia are symbiotic—that is, both conditions must be met. This constitutes the basic motive for the
dominant maritime power to intervene intermittently yet regularly into the continental
balance of power, especially when there appears a hegemonic threat on the continent.10 It
explains why historically Great Britain always felt compelled to intervene in the continental balance of power and the United States in the twentieth century found it necessary to intervene in two world wars. From the perspective of the dominant maritime
power, the most threatening challenger is a rimland power with mixed strategic orientations: primarily a land power with continental aspirations but also making serious
efforts to acquire sea power.11
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A rimland power with great maritime capabilities would pose two kinds of threat. First,
with great maritime capabilities a rimland power could directly threaten the leading maritime power with defeat at sea or invasion.12 In the eighteenth and twentieth
centuries, respectively, Louis XIV’s France and Wilhelm II’s Germany confronted Great
Britain with such a scenario. Second, with great maritime capabilities a rimland power
would be able to deprive the dominant maritime power of its ability to intervene effectively in the continental balance of power.13 That would leave the continental balance of
power at the mercy of the potential hegemon.
In a fundamental sense, the rimland powers’ pursuits of maritime transformation and
their struggles for European hegemony failed largely because of the functioning of the
European balance-of-power system. The crux of this mechanism was the recurrent
interventions by the dominant maritime power into the European continental balanceof-power system before a would-be hegemon could unify the region by coercion.14 From
1648 to 1945 Great Britain was the leading maritime power, on which the survival of the
European balance-of-power system depended on most occasions. Thus, it was regarded
as the balancer of the European states system. These interventions usually assumed the
form of a grand coalition organized and led by the dominant maritime power against
the challenger.15 It was this sort of intervention by the dominant maritime power that
ensured the proper functioning of the European balance-of-power system in modern
history. Since there were parallel interests between the dominant maritime power and
continental states, the intervention of the dominant maritime power would invariably
stimulate these states, especially continental great powers, to rise up against the challengers of the status quo (the balance of power) on the continent.16 Furthermore, given
their economic, financial, and naval supremacy, the leading maritime powers possessed
the necessary capabilities to help continental allies not only with naval blockade but also
with economic and financial support to maintain their efforts to wage war. This is the
essence of the British way of warfare expounded by Sir Basil Liddell Hart.17

Maritime Transformation and Sino-U.S. Relations
Like that of Great Britain in modern history, America’s position as the dominant power
in the world today still hinges fundamentally on preserving the balance of power in the
core regions of the Eurasian landmass.18 Since 1905 America’s essential strategic interest
in East Asia has been to maintain a balance of power on the opposite shore of the Pacific
Ocean. Throughout the twentieth century, the United States pursued this goal with
remarkable tenacity. American interest in maintaining a balance of power in East Asia
led to all of its wars there: the war against Japan, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.
The essential American interest in East Asia does not lie in any particular configuration. Rather, its overriding concern is with the balance of power per se.19 Refusal to allow
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another power to dominate this region has been a constant of America’s foreign policy
since it became a great power a century ago. Conforming to classical balance-of-power
theory, it has put its weight on the weaker side: China (versus Japan) during World
War II, Japan (versus the Soviet Union) at the outset of the Cold War, and China again
(versus the Soviet Union) after 1972.20 American strategic interests in East Asia did not
decline with the end of the Cold War; rather, they have increased, because of the region’s
growing importance.
From a geopolitical perspective, East Asia was inherently imbalanced, with China being
the dominant power, and this was the characteristic feature of the East Asian regional
system. However, the sphere of influence of imperial China was confined to continental
East Asia, never expanding effectively into the littoral seas. There have been various explanations for this conservative attitude toward the seas, but the basic reason lies simply
in imperial China’s maritime inadequacies.21 Though imperial China boasted an honorable heritage of maritime activities, it had never developed enough maritime capabilities
to allow itself to expand into maritime East Asia. This situation continued into the Cold
War years. China’s naval development during the Cold War was constrained by U.S.
dominance of maritime East Asia and later by internal policy debacles and deterioration
of relations with the Soviet Union. For many years, China’s deficiency in maritime capabilities has been the foundation of strategic stability in the western Pacific and maritime
East Asia.22 It is for this reason that the United States today stays vigilant against China’s
maritime transformation, not because China’s growing naval forces threaten the American homeland or sea-lane security. American strategic apprehensions today mainly stem
from considerations of the consequences of damage from this transformation to the
status quo in East Asia and the littoral seas.
From the American perspective, as the dominant land power in continental East Asia,
China in its pursuit of maritime capabilities will probably pose two strategic challenges
to American involvement and leadership in East Asia and the world. First, the exponential growth of the PLA Navy and its efforts to build a blue-water fleet (including
redoubtable submarine forces and amphibious capabilities), combined with powerful
land-based antiaccess capabilities, will enable China to undermine the existing strategic stability in East Asia, especially in East Asian littoral seas.23 Second, China’s areadenial capabilities, which comprise naval forces and land-based antiship ballistic and
cruise missiles, create serious doubt about U.S. capabilities to intervene effectively into
the regional balance of power in East Asia. This doubt will surely rock the American
bilateral alliance system in East Asia and undermine its strategic credibility among East
Asian allies.24 Given China’s dominance in continental East Asia, maritime transformation would enable it to become powerful enough to upset the existing balance of power
in East Asia and the littoral seas, a balance that has depended on China’s deficiency in
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maritime capabilities. This scenario also means that the United States will probably be
confronted by a regional system—including both continental and maritime East Asia—
that is closed to American political, economic, and cultural influence. This is absolutely
unacceptable in American eyes.
America’s growing concern with China’s ongoing maritime transformation has much to
do with the strategic geography of East Asia.25 The East Asian littoral seas lie between
the continental coastline and the “first island chain,” running south from the Japanese
archipelago to the Philippines. This expanse of sea is strategically known as the “near
seas” of East Asia. From China’s perspective, command of the East Asian near seas is
both natural, in light of geographic location, and justified, given that most of China’s
maritime territorial and economic interests are located in this body of water. Command
of the near seas not merely involves the struggle for sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands
and the Spratly Islands but also will determine whether mainland China and Taiwan can
be finally reunified; it is also needed to ensure the safety and security of China’s prosperous eastern coastal lands.26 These interests contradict in a fundamental sense those of
the United States. From the American perspective, the bodies of water bounded by the
first island chain are integral to the global order underwritten by U.S. and allied naval
power. These waterways convey the lifeblood of economic vitality to all regional economies in East Asia, including China’s. To complicate matters, America’s East Asian allies—
such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines—are all located inside or along the first
island chain. Losing command of the East Asian near seas would mean the collapse of
the American “hub and spoke” alliance system in East Asia.27 It is this contradiction of
interests that causes Americans to be deeply concerned by recent displays of China’s
naval capabilities.

The Policy Implications for China
Maritime transformation, defined as an attempt by a state to transform itself from a pure
land power to a land/sea-hybrid power, is rare in modern history. Only a few states have
the qualifications to pursue maritime transformation, and among those that have, none
have succeeded. This partly explains why the study of maritime transformation has not
received attention by scholars of strategic studies until recently. In light of the few cases
of maritime transformation in modern history, what strategic lessons can we draw from
them? What are the policy implications for China if it wants to avoid the failures foretold
by history? These questions are worth considering, given that China as a rimland power
faces strategic deficiencies similar to those of modern France and Germany.
States, like individuals, have natural endowments. This fact explains why the distribution
of sea power among nations in the world is so uneven. Alfred T. Mahan devoted the entire introductory section to his first book to elaborating the elements of sea power, and
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his conclusion was simple: nautical endowments largely predetermine how much sea
power a nation can enjoy.28 Compared with a landlocked or island country, a land/seahybrid power like China generally has certain strategic weaknesses: first, the strategic dilemma between facing the land and facing the sea; second, the dual pressure from both
land and sea; and third, deciding how to allocate limited resources to serve the greater
national strategy.29 During the past five centuries, as a result of the unique weaknesses
and constraints of being a land/sea-hybrid power, China missed several precious opportunities to develop itself into a powerful modern state. Despite the security and stability
of China’s land borders in the post–Cold War period, a situation that has allowed China
to concentrate its energy and resources on seaborne development, the strategic vulnerabilities of being a land/sea-hybrid power have not absolutely disappeared, once and for
all. In fact, to ensure its long-term safety and security, China still has to find the appropriate balance between the land and the sea.
Related to the balance between land and sea, China also needs to reconsider the role of
sea power in the world today. One basic motive for China’s development of maritime,
especially naval, capabilities is to ensure the long-term well-being of the Chinese nation. This is partly inspired by the Chinese understanding of Alfred T. Mahan’s classic
works.30 Mahan’s arguments about sea power and its influence were mainly founded on
the proposition that “travel and traffic by water have always been easier and cheaper
than by land.” Though railroads had largely displaced water transport in his own time,
Mahan maintained that ships still constituted the primary form of carriage for trade and
would continue to do so in the future.31 From this premise, through a series of historical
studies, Mahan induced two influential conclusions. First, the maritime economy—
namely, production, shipping, and colonies—was the key to national prosperity. Second,
the possession of naval supremacy was essential to the protection of national interests
related to production, shipping, and colonies.32 However, Mahan’s precepts on the close
connection between sea power and the wealth and prosperity of nations were built on
the presumption that what had happened in the past was going to occur in the future as
well. “Mahan largely looked to the past; he gained his lessons from a study of the past
and used the past for analogies.”33 Chinese elites who seek inspiration from Mahan seem
to have ignored the historical context of Mahan’s “philosophy of sea power.”
One major lesson revealed by maritime transformations in history is that the rimland
powers’ pursuit of maritime capabilities failed largely because of the dual pressure from
the dominant maritime power and neighboring states. It was this dual pressure, or balancing against the rimland powers, that led to their final failures. This is largely because
there existed common interests between these two kinds of states to prevent the rise of
the land/sea-hybrid power located on the rimland. Likewise, as a rimland power, China
too has encountered, in its recent pursuit of maritime, especially naval, capabilities a
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series of unfavorable or even antagonistic reactions from neighboring states and the
United States, the dominant maritime power today. Though these unfavorable responses
do not necessarily mean that China should abandon its maritime-dominant development, it does mean that China must take those responses and concerns into serious
consideration as it plots the country’s future course.
The most important issue facing contemporary China’s maritime development is how
to overcome the pressure from neighboring states, exemplified clearly in the challenges
China has endured in recent years in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.
Despite the Chinese government’s repeatedly showing no intent to challenge the existing
international order, it has faced hostility from other states adjacent to these waters. To
complicate matters, China has insisted on dealing with neighboring states over maritime
disputes in bilateral, rather than multilateral, settings and has staunchly resisted the
involvement of extraregional powers, especially the United States, in its disputes with
neighboring states over maritime issues. To dispel effectively suspicion and pressure
from neighboring states, China should strive to establish a series of multilateral institutions, with “all hands on deck” throughout the process. In addition to taking initiative in
shaping a regionalized system binding China and its neighbors, China probably has to
tolerate the participation of outside powers (principally the United States). Without the
guarantees of extraregional powers, China simply cannot form any meaningful institutional mechanism with neighboring countries, especially “second level” powers and
smaller states.
Another problem that contemporary China’s maritime development must overcome is
how to deal with pressure from the leading maritime power and system leader, namely,
the United States. When China responds to this type of pressure, the issue to which it
must pay close attention is creating a type of truly open regionalized and globalized
international order, taking into consideration the historically formed core interests of the
leading maritime power and system leader. In short, one of the core interests of the leading maritime power and system leader is keeping the Eurasian core regions (especially
Europe and East Asia) politically, economically, and culturally open to itself and its various allies and followers. Thus, in the foreseeable future China must not only tolerate the
participation of the leading maritime power and system leader in shaping the regional
system but establish a truly open ideology. Only by doing this can China effectively
lessen, if not eliminate, the strategic distrust regarding its long-term intentions widely
held by the United States and neighboring states.
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C HAPTER THREE

Multipolar Trends and Sea-Lane Security
Xu Qiyu

G

iven the diffusion of global power exemplified by the association of five major
emerging national economies known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa) and by the “Group of Twenty” (G20), the return of a multipolar international system looks more certain than it did in the previous decade. In the field of
international security, many issues are addressed in a multilateral and cooperative way, a
marked contrast to the past, in which zero-sum contention between great powers was often the norm. Such changes are bound to impact the international security environment
in myriad ways. At a time when navies are working with each other to combat piracy in
waters off Somalia, it is natural to wonder to what extent the trend toward multipolarity
will affect sea-lane security, which for centuries has been under the guard of the world’s
leading sea power.

Multipolarity at Sea?
This question is vital. Many assume that the international power structure is reflected in
all aspects of international affairs, including the maritime domain. However, the historical record suggests that maritime issues, particularly maritime security, tend to be not
entirely sensitive to shifts in the international power structure.
Many scholars accept that the world in the era prior to the First World War was multipolar. Great Britain, the dominant country during most of the eighteenth century and the
nineteenth century, was eclipsed by the United States and Germany in manufacturing.
Russia also showed its enormous potential when it began its industrialization. In East
Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the whole Western Hemisphere, Britain’s influence relied increasingly on the goodwill of other major powers. However, this multipolar
power structure coexisted with Great Britain’s untrammeled supremacy at sea. During
the last decades of the nineteenth century Britain was not confronted with any serious
challenge at sea, notwithstanding the poor condition and lack of preparedness of the
Royal Navy. The French navy, the Royal Navy’s leading competitor in the nineteenth
century, was much inferior to it in strength and personnel. The Russian navy, the thirdranking navy in Europe, was notoriously inefficient. During this period the Royal Navy
was also occupied with numerous peacetime functions: suppressing native uprisings,
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rescuing slaves and ships in distress, stamping out piracy, stopping smugglers, aiding the
victims of earthquakes and other disasters, and charting the seas, among many others.1
In brief, the Royal Navy remained dominant at sea in a period of shifting power and
increasing multipolarity. Security of the strategic sea-lanes was indisputably under the
control of Britain (“five [strategic] keys that lock up the world,” as Admiral of the Fleet
John Fisher put it).2 Neither traditional challenges (from other states) nor nontraditional
challenges could threaten this dominance.
Nor could imperial Germany’s naval expansion challenge it. Although the first decade of
the twentieth century witnessed the relative decline of British national power, with both
the United States and Germany surpassing it in terms of economic output, Britain’s grasp
of naval supremacy proved tenacious. A serious naval race between Britain and Germany lasted almost fourteen years. However, by 1912 it had become clear that Germany
had lost the race, and most rational politicians in the Second Reich privately confessed
it. In fact, Britain’s control of sea-lane security lasted for more than twenty years after it
lost its top place in the international power structure. After that, there was only a very
brief period of multipolarity at sea before the United States achieved naval supremacy
and became sole custodian of the strategic sea-lanes.
This review of history points to at least two basic implications. First, the emergence of a
multipolar international power structure does not necessarily lead to a multipolar structure at sea. To the contrary, such transformation has proved to be difficult and much
delayed. In the past two centuries there was only a very brief period of multipolarity in
the maritime domain—during the interwar era. Second, sea-lane security relies exclusively on the country whose maritime power dominates the ocean. On the one hand,
only such a country has sufficient capacity and credibility to safeguard sea-lane security.
On the other hand, since the responsibility of maintaining sea-lane security belonged to
the world’s dominant sea power for centuries, such responsibility is treated as a symbol
of dominance at sea.
From this perspective, the current realities of sea-lane security will not change in
the foreseeable future. The United States will remain the top sea power, in charge of
sea-lane security in a broad sense. However, U.S. dominance at sea in a complicated
world demands further exploration. Joseph Nye has vividly depicted American power
in terms of a “three-dimensional chessboard”: on the military chessboard, the United
States undoubtedly retains supremacy; on the economic chessboard, the United States
already operates in a multipolar world; and on the chessboard of transnational relations,
by which he means the realm of cross-border transactions, no country is in charge.3
In a similar vein, U.S. dominance at sea, including its dominant position astride the
international sea-lanes, could be described as a “two-dimensional chessboard”: on the
chessboard of traditional security, the strength, efficiency, and preparedness of the U.S.
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Navy indisputably make America the dominant power at sea; on the nontraditional
chessboard, U.S. power seems insufficient to address all the security challenges posed by
nonstate factors.

New Elements That Impact Sea-Lane Security
Although the contemporary trend toward multipolarity in the international power
structure will not lead to a similar trend in the maritime domain, there are some new
elements that will impact maritime security, especially sea-lane security.
Rising Stakes
Dependence on international sea-lanes has increased dramatically since the end of the
Cold War, driven by deepening globalization and the rise of a highly integrated world
economy. Free and secure sea-lanes have been particularly critical to the expansion of
economies in the Asia-Pacific region, facilitating transport of raw materials into this
region and of manufactured goods out to the global market.
Among those materials, the most significant resource is energy. Asian oil consumption
has risen far more quickly than that of any other region in the world, growing from 17
percent of global daily consumption in 1983 to 31 percent by 2009. China in particular
has seen its dependence on foreign oil rise dramatically since it became a net importer
of oil in 1993. Another emerging economy, India, has also experienced fast growth in
consumption of foreign oil.
The vast majority of oil imported to the Asia-Pacific region is transported by sea, much
of it passing through the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. For China, Japan,
and the Republic of Korea, 80 to 90 percent of energy imports from the Middle East and
Africa pass through the Strait of Malacca and other sea-lanes in Southeast Asia.4 According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, about seven million barrels per day
of oil and petroleum products (20 percent of world seaborne oil trade) passed through
the Strait of Malacca in 1993, but in 2011 trade through Malacca exceeded fifteen million barrels per day (one-third of world seaborne oil trade). Moreover, the Strait of Malacca is also the most important channel for liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade. Roughly
half of world LNG trade passed through it in 2011.5
In brief, with their rapidly expanding, globally integrated economies, the countries of
the Asia-Pacific region have increasing stakes in sea-lane security. This dynamic will
inevitably alter the mind-sets of policy makers charged with ensuring the security and
prosperity of their respective nations.
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A Changing Threat Profile
Another new trend germane to sea-lane security is the changing composition of security threats. Historically, sea-lane security faced multiple threats, but state actors were
often the greatest impediments to free passage at sea, particularly in times of crisis and
conflict. During the past two decades, however, threats from state actors have declined
significantly, while those from nonstate threats have increased.
Regional Conflicts. Conflicts between or within littoral countries often pose threats to
sea-lane security. The Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s is a recent example of state-state conflict detrimental to the free movement of ships at sea. Threats to sea-lane security from
this conflict led to the involvement of the U.S. Navy, which reflagged and escorted neutral Kuwaiti tankers through the Strait of Hormuz in 1987. Indonesia’s effort to deal with
a separatist movement in the early 2000s is a case of conflict within a littoral state that
ultimately threatened international sea-lane security. In 2003, as a part of its campaign
against Acehnese separatists, the Indonesian government declared parts of the country’s
territorial waters off Sumatra a maritime exclusion zone, ostensibly to prevent attacks by
Islamist separatists in Aceh.6 The Indonesian government’s decision to close Acehnese
waters to all maritime traffic and foreign-flagged shipping was made reluctantly, but it
was absolutely within the sphere of sovereignty.
In the future, regional conflicts will continue to threaten to disrupt international sealanes. For China, the sea-lane most critical to the country’s security is potentially vulnerable to foreign coercive pressure. Some major power might deliberately resort to such
a strategy to achieve a goal (perhaps entirely unrelated to the sea-lanes themselves).7
Moreover, disputes over unresolved territorial and maritime boundaries have the potential to lead to conflict that could disrupt use of the sea-lanes.
Nonstate Threats. Natural disasters, piracy (an ancient activity adapted to modern
conditions), and terrorism represent nonstate threats to sea-lane security. Tsunamis,
earthquakes, cyclones, and other natural disasters can cause serious disruption to use
of sea-lanes, usually by damaging coastal infrastructure. Piracy is a growing threat to
sea-lane security, particularly in the Indian Ocean; in 2009, this region accounted for
over 50 percent of pirate attacks throughout the world.8 Threats from terrorism have
also become increasingly conspicuous, particularly since the 9/11 attack in 2001. The
sea-lanes across the Indian Ocean have witnessed several actual and attempted terrorist
attacks, including the suicide bombing of the large crude carrier MV Limburg in 2002. In
China, scholars and others have become worried about possible attacks in the Malacca
Strait. Some have even predicted that a suicide-bomb attack on a large oil tanker or LNG
carrier could cause a lengthy closure of this crucial choke point.9
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Diversified Tasks and Changing Fleet Sizes
An increasing variety of threats will inevitably bring a greater diversity of tasks for navies
to complete. However, the size of the U.S. Navy’s fleet has declined considerably since
the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the bipolar superpower balance lowered the
demand for large-scale overseas expeditions, large-scale military presence, and strategic
strike missions. Meanwhile, the rapid development of key technologies made it possible to retain the navy’s efficiency and fighting power despite a much smaller fleet size.
Technologies to improve intelligence-gathering capabilities seem to have had the greatest
effect in this naval transformation. The phrase “network-centric warfare” encompasses
a geographic and organizational decentralization and the use of advanced communication and sensor systems to achieve distant action with minimal need to mass physical forces. The intelligence-technology revolution also brought about unmanned and
smart weapon systems, which further reduce the importance of numbers for the navy
or indeed any military service.10 As a result, over the past two decades the U.S. Navy has
shrunk to about half the size of the Cold War–era fleet, while achieving growth in its
efficiency and fighting power.
However, addressing nontraditional threats at sea is often labor-intensive. At present,
the U.S. Navy, a highly advanced, efficient, and powerful “smart navy” (in comparison
with the U.S. Navy of the Cold War), is capable of defeating any hostile navy or deterring
any potential challenges from other states at sea. But owing to its comparatively limited
physical size it is less fit for coping with nontraditional tasks.
At the same time, some countries—including India, China, and other Asian states—are
expanding and modernizing their maritime capabilities the better to safeguard their
interests at sea. These trends may suggest that a more cooperative model to bolster sealane security is increasingly becoming both feasible and necessary.
Growing Multilateralism at Sea
Since the end of the Cold War, multilateral cooperation aimed at enhancing sea-lane
security has increased. Although the U.S. Navy still plays an indisputably dominant role
in the maritime domain, some tentative steps toward sharing costs and responsibilities
have already been taken and have been increasingly accepted and encouraged by the
international community, including the United States.
In the Gulf of Aden, cooperative antipiracy and escort initiatives by navies from different
countries are eye-catching, but they take place on more or less an ad hoc basis. In the
Asia-Pacific region, however, there are several well-developed multilateral mechanisms
that successfully address threats and problems through cooperative work. In the case of
the Malacca Strait, the littoral states have introduced such initiatives as trilateral coordinated patrols of the straits, code-named the MALSINDO Malacca Strait Coordinated
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Patrols. Thailand’s later joining in this initiative led to “eyes in the sky” patrols to enhance coordinated aerial surveillance of the straits.11 The ReCAAP is another multilateral effort to increase sea-lane security across Malacca and other parts of Southeast Asia.
This mechanism includes information sharing, capacity building, and practice sharing
among member states. It also allows the accession of states and partnership agreements
with other organizations outside the region.12 Such inclusiveness gives ReCAAP more
strength to carry out multilateral cooperation in a region with diverse interests and
competing needs.
Potential Geopolitical Competition and Distrust between Major Powers
The trend toward multipolarity in the international power structure clearly influences
the calculations of the major powers. For example, China, with its expanding overseas
interests, has been investing heavily in the safeguarding of the sea-lanes that are so critical to its security and economic development. However, China’s rapidly growing strength
has triggered the sensitive problem of “power shift.” Some major powers, including the
United States, have come to view such developments from a perspective of geopolitical competition. China’s diplomatic and economic efforts to pursue greater support
from certain littoral countries are described as constituting a “string of pearls” strategy,
although China itself has never used such a term. While acknowledging that China’s
purpose is to safeguard the sea-lanes, some scholars, such as Robert Kaplan, still imply
that these defensive gestures might not be compatible with U.S. supremacy at sea: “The
Chinese have more and more equities to protect in sub-Saharan Africa. . . . To be sure,
control and access to sea lines of communication are more important now than during
Mahan’s years, and American preponderance over such routes may not be destined to
continue forever.”13
When China indicates that the PLA Navy, or PLAN, must be strengthened to address
emerging problems at sea, this leads to more worries, although scholars like John J.
Mearsheimer have argued that “the most dangerous states in the international system
are continental powers with large armies”; naval power is often believed to be more
benign than land power.14 In short, the trend toward multipolarity and the possibility of
a “power shift” increase suspicions among some major powers, suspicions that inevitably
harm international cooperation on security.

A New Approach: Benefits and Problems
The five elements described above suggest the increasing feasibility of multilateral cooperation on sea-lane security, although the fifth one is basically negative. The benefits
of this new approach are obvious enough. In the case of the United States, owing to
the declining numbers of vessels, the Navy is facing considerable mission stress. More

beyond the wall

29

international cooperation could not only relieve such stress but also allow the United
States to counter threats more comprehensively and efficiently. Moreover, a multilateral
approach would enable America to accommodate newly emerging regional powers in
regional security structures and help avoid miscalculation.15 Finally, greater multilateral
cooperation, particularly in the realm of nontraditional issues, will not undermine U.S.
supremacy at sea. That is, on the “chessboard” of traditional sea power the United States
will retain all its advantages.
For China and India, the benefits are also clear. A multilateral approach could effectively
relieve many of their concerns regarding sea-lane security. Second, since threats at sea
have multiplied in recent decades, an approach that merges contributions from China
and India could be more effective in safeguarding sea-lane security. In contributions
to order in the maritime commons these two countries could find a more effective way
of securing their own interests while not causing unnecessary concern among smaller
countries in the region. Third, multilateral cooperation to maintain sea-lane security
helps build trust among all the parties involved. The national security adviser of India,
Shiv Shankar Menon, has identified sea-lane security as a possible starting point for collective security efforts in the region, noting that the convergence of interests on the issue
lends itself to a collaborative approach.16 Fourth, multilateral cooperation of this type
supports a cooperative/collaborative model for great-power relations. This is particularly
important for China. Lack of trust between China and the United States continues to
be a problem, creating the possibility of miscalculation on both sides. The PLA Navy’s
growing capabilities intensify concerns in the United States that China may seek to undermine American dominance at sea, in spite of the huge gap between the two navies. By
operating side by side in common causes, the PLA Navy and the U.S. Navy could forge
trust, at least at the operational level. Confidence and mutual trust will increase gradually with growth in the frequency and intensity of such cooperative operations. In any
case, cooperation on smaller issues can lower the threshold for cooperation on larger,
more sensitive ones.
To achieve this goal, important problems must be worked out. The first is the legality
and legitimacy of such actions. Multilateral cooperation/collaboration for the purpose
of securing the sea-lanes has to be consistent with international law. At present there
are few established guidelines or treaties that address this issue directly. Cooperation in
the Gulf of Aden sets a good precedent, but this case has yet to be generalized in terms
of international law. The second problem involves differing levels of capability. Disparities in the naval capabilities of participating nations will make it difficult to cooperate
efficiently and achieve equality among partners. A third problem is differing interests
and priorities. Regional powers, external powers, user states, and littoral states all tend
to approach sea-lane security from different perspectives. They differ not only in their
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respective interests in use of the sea-lanes but also in how they perceive threats and set
priorities. The final problem involves territorial disputes and strategic suspicions. Such
problems will hamper collective action, particularly among major powers.

A Responsible Stakeholder: China and the New Approach
As mentioned above, China is increasingly dependent on sea-lanes and will benefit from
international cooperation at sea. China’s naval modernization is driven by “concerns
about international terrorist organizations, disruptions to the global economy, protection of the ocean as a ‘vehicle for mutual commerce,’ protection of China’s enterprises
overseas, and its dependence on distant supplies of raw materials.”17 Chinese leaders have
made it clear that China is a responsible power, and China’s involvement in international
maritime cooperation reflects this reality. China has supported United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1816 by sending naval vessels to patrol the waters off Somalia and by
participating in Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings. In the AsiaPacific region, China has joined most regional maritime security mechanisms and has
concluded cooperative agreements with the littoral states of the Malacca Strait and with
Thailand.
But China should do more in this respect. In a recent book Robert Kaplan criticized
China’s approach to maritime affairs: “[China] should be concerned mainly with the free
movement of trade and the preservation of a peaceful maritime system. But China has
not reached that stage of self-confidence yet. When it comes to the sea, it still thinks territorially, like an insecure land power, trying to expand in concentric circles in a manner
suggested by Spykman.”18 Maybe he is partly right. At least he points out two essential
elements that impede China from playing a more important role in cooperation for sealane security.
One is a mind-set shaped largely by history and geography. Historically, China was basically a land power. Geographically or geopolitically, China could be categorized as “land/
sea-hybrid power,” which means that its attention and resources are prone to distraction
from developments on both land and sea. In the contemporary world, China is confronted with a series of disputes over territorial and maritime rights with neighboring
countries, which also, without exception, think territorially. So it is difficult for China to
think like a maritime power—that is, to concern itself mainly with the free flow of goods
at sea and a sustainable global maritime system.
The other important point raised by Kaplan concerns the limitations of China’s capabilities at sea. Although the PLA Navy has experienced rapid development in recent years, it
is still far from a “blue-water navy.” Even if the PLAN’s overseas operational capabilities
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improve markedly, China will not be able to play a leading role in multilateral maritime
cooperation, because of its lack of an overseas base system.
There is also a third factor that prevents China from playing a more important role in
sea-lane security—mistrust between China and the United States. America suspects
that China’s expanding activities and growing capabilities in the maritime domain will
eventually challenge U.S. dominance at sea, while China, according to some analysts, is
wary of initiatives inspired by the United States and sometimes suspects that America is
strengthening its own strategic position in the western Pacific region under the guise of
sea-lane security cooperation (in combating terrorism, for example).19
To improve China’s role in multilateral cooperation for sea-lane security, these impediments must be dealt with. China will likely deal with them in the following ways.
•• More participation. China will continue to participate in multilateral cooperation,
regarding it as the most important approach to safeguarding sea-lane security. As the
experience and capacities of the PLAN grow, Chinese operations will be increasingly
integrated into collective international operations. If the PLAN is to be effective in
that context, its interoperability with navies of foreign partners has to improve.
•• More cooperation with the U.S. Navy. The link between the PLAN and the U.S. Navy is
crucial to the effectiveness of multilateral sea-lane security cooperation. In the foreseeable future, the best settings for collaboration will be overseas regions, where the
two countries could both avoid some political sensitivities. In the long run, partnership in the area of sea-lane security will be an important part of military-to-military
relations and an important element of “new type of great-power relations” (新型大国
关系).
•• More attention to mechanisms. With regard to the cooperative approach to sea-lane
security, China will likely pay more attention to the mechanisms that support such
cooperation. So far, China has been more a follower in maritime security cooperation than an initiator. As its experience and capabilities improve, however, China will
be more active in this respect. It will pay attention to the following goals: inclusivity
and flexibility, respect for sovereignty, effectiveness and efficiency, and full use of the
existing mechanism.
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C HAPTER F O UR

Chinese Cooperation to Protect Sea-Lane Security
Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden
Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange

A

ntipiracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden represent a successful example of cooperation
between China and the international community to achieve sea-lane security far
from China’s shores. Over the past six years, Chinese naval ships and personnel joined
elements of over forty other navies in the fight against Somali piracy. This represents
the first time that the People’s Republic of China has deployed naval forces operationally
(as opposed to representationally) beyond its immediate maritime borders. The People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) antipiracy escort task forces, typically composed of one
or more guided-missile frigates and destroyers and a supply ship, have escorted ships
from China and other nations in armed convoys since the inaugural escort task force
departed China on 26 December 2008. At the mission’s sixth anniversary at the end of
2014, fifteen thousand personnel in nineteen PLAN task forces had escorted nearly six
thousand merchant ships—roughly half of them foreign—in eight hundred batches. The
task forces had “performed deliveries of eight vessels released by pirates, rescued and
aided eight vessels under attack[,] . . . saved forty-three vessels from the chase of pirates,”
and rendered other assistance to five vessels.1
Despite earlier signals that China might halt its contributions, PLAN antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden continue uninterrupted and are likely to persist for the foreseeable future. “So far,” the commander of the PLAN, Adm. Wu Shengli, told one of the
authors in September 2014, “There is no end in sight for the mission.”2 On 12 November
2014 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) extended its mandate for state navies
to fight piracy off Somalia until 12 November 2015.3 Already likely to continue contributions, on the strength of policies and past practice, the PLAN became almost certain to
do so following the announcement in late 2014 that the navy of China’s East Asian rival
Japan, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, would soon take command of a major
international antipiracy coalition.4
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Understanding China’s Antipiracy Operations: Rules of Engagement
China’s conduct of antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden is undergirded by robust
and explicit international-law authorities. The United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) clearly authorizes foreign navies to fight piracy outside a coastal
state’s territorial sea. The UNSC initially passed several relevant resolutions (UNSCRs)
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter throughout 2008 to construct a legal basis for
international antipiracy. One of six resolutions mentioning Somali piracy during that
year, UNSCR 1801, noted international concern with Somali piracy.5 UNSCR 1816 initially authorized a six-month window in which navies were to use “all necessary means”
to repress piracy in Somalia’s territorial waters.6 Later that year, UNSCRs 1838 and
1844 affirmed international concern over Somali pirates, while UNSCR 1846 explicitly
mentioned the initial invitiation by the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
for international assistance as well as subsequent calls for UNSCR 1816 to be extended.7
UNSCR 1851 officially extended the right for navies to fight piracy in Somali waters by
twelve months beginning 2 December 2008, the date that UNSCR 1846 was passed, and
authorized international navies to pursue pirates from the Gulf of Aden to the shores
of Somalia and—if conditions warranted—to engage in related activities “in Somalia”
itself.8 Since then, the UNSC has passed subsequent resolutions renewing in twelvemonth increments the international community’s authority to repress Somali piracy.9
Renewals have been preceded by letters from the TFG (now the Federal Government of
Somalia [FGS]) to the UNSC calling explicitly for such action.
China consistently proceeds with great care in taking actions that might be viewed as
violations of other states’ sovereignty. In addition to the UN mandates, Beijing first
obtained an explicit invitation to participate in antipiracy operations near Somalia from
Mogadishu’s ambassador to China, Ahmed Awil.10 It subsequently emphasized that
international assistance “should be based on the wishes of the [Somali] Government.”11
Combined, these hard assurances constitute the legal mortar of the PLAN’s continued
antipiracy operations off the coast of Somalia.
The PLAN has pledged a cautious approach to use of force, limited to defense of its ships
and vessels under its escort. Nonetheless, China’s antipiracy operations have gradually become more expansive and innovative. While initially PLAN task forces escorted
only mainland China–, Hong Kong–, and Taiwan-flagged merchant vessels, China has
become increasingly willing to provide recourse for foreign-flagged ships; over half the
vessels escorted to date have in fact been foreign flagged. The explicit objective is not
to search actively for pirates and engage in combat with them but rather to escort ships
and thus deter pirates from attacking them in the first place. PLAN forces will not “take
the initiative to search for captured vessels and personnel at sea and carry out armed
rescues.”12 Senior Capt. Ma Luping, director of the Navy Operational Bureau of the
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PLA General Staff, states that PLAN forces will not “normally” enter another nation’s
territorial seas (i.e., within the internationally recognized twelve-nautical-mile limit)
to chase pirates.13 While PLAN antipiracy forces have ventured into Somali waters and
even briefly landed on Somali shores to rescue hostages, there is no explicit evidence
that the PLAN has failed to honor the spirit of this pledge. Upon the initial deployment
in December 2008, Rear Adm. Du Jingcheng, the escort task force commander at the
time, stated that PLAN ships would “independently conduct escort missions” and avoid
landing on Somali shores.14 Another senior Chinese military official has remarked, “For
us to use force is a very complex matter[;] . . . it is not just a simple question based on an
operational requirement. . . . There are political questions—and these are not issues dealt
with by military commanders alone. Our warships off Somalia are very well aware of
this. We are fully prepared to use force, but we do not take that step lightly.”15
Cautious rules of engagement imposed on the PLAN reflect China’s desire to minimize
risks associated with political and legal issues that would arise as a result of engaging
suspected pirates. A lack of viable legal options for prosecution and the possibility of
negative political ramifications, particularly in the Muslim world, disincentivize China
from combating pirates directly. Additionally, killing pirates could put unwanted targets
on the backs of PLAN vessels or Chinese-flagged commercial ships if pirates sought
revenge.16
Of course, caution does not necessarily equate to low impact. PLAN antipiracy task
forces in the Gulf of Aden have adapted to the needs of specific situations while technically operating within the operational confines described above. For example, in
November 2010 the vessel Taiankou, owned by the China Overseas Shipping Company,
was attacked by four Somali pirates. The twenty-one crewmen on board evaded capture
by hiding in the security cabin. Special Forces from the destroyer Xuzhou, in the region
for antipiracy missions, were dispatched via helicopter and speedboat. PLAN antipiracy
forces appeared ready to engage, posting snipers and launching flares, flash-bangs, and
percussion grenades to warn any potential pirates still present as they boarded.17 After
searching the ship thoroughly, the PLAN forces reported that no pirates had been found
on the ship and proceeded to free the sailors.18 In 2012, the frigate Changzhou of the
twelfth escort task force dispatched Special Forces soldiers who briefly landed on Somali
shores to extract freed hostages from Taiwanese fishing vessel Shiuh-fu.19 Despite somewhat rigid rules of engagement, the above instances reflect a capacity to react effectively
to unscripted situations. This emphasis is also ever present in PLAN antipiracy training, which has focused on raising the ability of PLAN crewmen to react to unforeseen
circumstances.20
The PLAN has managed to improve operationally within its given rules of engagement.21
However, this is not to say that PLAN leaders are, on balance, completely satisfied with
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antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. For example, key legal deficiencies prevent
China from dealing more effectively with the problem of piracy. One issue is that of
detaining suspected pirates. China’s antipiracy operations, though the largest of any
independent deployer in the Gulf of Aden, have never resulted in the detention of a
suspected pirate and serve only to deter attacks.22 The PLAN and other navies face
formidable obstacles in this regard, such as accurately identifying pirates at sea, obtaining photographic evidence, securing witnesses to piracy crimes, and collecting evidence
from victimized ships.23 More broadly, China and states committed to eradicating piracy
frequently emphasize that the true fight is not on the water but on Somali soil, where
persistently failed governance and abysmal economic prospects lead otherwise helpless
Somalis, many of whom were initially commercial fishermen, to engage in piracy. Gen.
Chen Bingde, then the PLA Chief of Staff, suggested in 2011 that “for counter-piracy
campaigns to be effective, we should probably move beyond the ocean and crush their
bases on the land.”24 That said, there are no indications that China, without the explicit
mandate of the UN or support of the FGS, would undertake measures similar to air raids
conducted by EU NAVFOR in 2013 to uproot piracy bases on land.

Cooperation with Other Militaries and the Diplomatic Element of Antipiracy
Operations
Beijing has achieved noteworthy cooperation with the United States and other states in
the conduct of its antipiracy operations. This is especially remarkable since the majority
of international navies contributing to the fight against Somali piracy do so under the
command of multilateral mechanisms, while those of China and some other countries,
such as India and Russia, coordinate with counterparts in the region but operate autonomously. The primary multilateral antipiracy forces in the region are known as “the Three
Forces”: Combined Maritime Forces Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), led by the
United States; Operation Ocean Shield (previously Operation Allied Protector),
led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and Operation Atalanta, led
by the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR).
From the outset, while the autonomous navies have conducted antipiracy operations in
ways fundamentally different from those of the Three Forces, the PLAN has been “ready
to exchange information and cooperate with the warships of other countries in fighting
Somalian pirates.”25 At the time of the first deployment, the deployment commander,
Adm. Du Jingcheng, stated that the PLAN would “not accept the command of other
countries or regional organizations” but was willing to “facilitate exchanges of information with escort naval vessels from other countries.”26 This statement has held true: the
PLAN has gradually increased communications with vessels from the United States
and over twenty other countries and has conducted several shipboard exchanges of
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commanding officers and with CTF-151 staff.27 In recent years a voluntary, multinational antipiracy coordination mechanism known as Shared Awareness and Deconfliction
(SHADE) has facilitated tighter integration of the antipiracy operations of multilateral
and independent naval actors, including China, which continues to make meaningful
contributions to SHADE.
To date, the willingness of the PLAN and other independent navies to synchronize their
antipiracy operations through the SHADE mechanism has been a bright spot for the
international fight against piracy. While China was denied chairmanship of SHADE in
2009, both the international community and China have proactively sought to enhance
the PLAN’s role in the mechanism. Specifically, China participates in SHADE’s Convoy
Coordination Working Group, which coordinates escort schedules between navies such
as those of China, India, Japan, and South Korea.28 SHADE is ultimately chaired by
Western-centric naval forces; however, China likely prefers to cooperate with it because
of its voluntary and multilateral nature, whereas other multilateral forces, such as CTF151, are commanded by the United States. Also, there are potential security barriers to
more direct integration between China and traditional navies in the region; SHADE
provides an innovative, low-sensitivity platform that has facilitated important breakthroughs in maritime nontraditional security cooperation between China and Western
states. There are indeed signs of growing teamwork and cooperation; reportedly the
PLAN deployed antipiracy forces south of the Bab el Mandeb to help fill gaps in patrol
left by the Three Forces.29 In summary, while SHADE highlights the major differences in
approaches to dealing with the piracy problem, it also demonstrates a successful formula,
one involving the mutual support and tolerance of different preferences that are needed to
foster more institutionalized engagement between China and Western naval forces.
China has also attempted to coordinate with other navies in the fight against piracy in
various ways other than SHADE. In 2009 it called for apportioning the Gulf of Aden and
surrounding waterways into zones that each navy would protect independently, though
the notion never came to fruition.30 The PLAN has regularly visited and hosted other
naval task forces, including, as noted, periodic shipboard exchanges with the commanders of CTF-151, NATO, and EU NAVFOR. PLAN antipiracy forces have conducted joint
exercises with a diverse cohort of international partners, including Pakistan, Russia,
South Korea, and the United States. A 2010 article in Modern Navy recapitulated the
PLAN’s underlying approach to international antipiracy cooperation: “While insisting
on ‘self-direction’ [以我为主] [when] conducting escorts, China’s navy [also] is actively
expanding international maritime military exchanges and cooperation [and] gradually
establishing and exploring escort methods and mechanisms with relevant countries.”31
China has been true to its word in this regard and has engaged in various forms of international antipiracy cooperation. For instance, the PLAN previously assigned a surface
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vessel to help monitor the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor jointly with
CTF-151 forces and has escorted a total of eight UN World Food Programme vessels.32
In 2012, 2013, and 2014, China engaged with the U.S. Navy in joint antipiracy exercises
in the Gulf of Aden, even amid considerable strategic tension in East Asia between Beijing and other Asian capitals, many of them U.S. security partners.33
Beyond its high-seas piracy deterrence and ship-protection patrols, China has effectively
leveraged this six-year far-seas antipiracy mission to conduct wide-ranging naval diplomacy. This is significant because China’s deployment and associated activities have allowed it to be a “responsible stakeholder” in international society, particularly in the area
of maritime nontraditional security.34 When it escorted World Food Programme vessels
into Somali ports, China ceased being the only permanent UNSC member not to have
done so. Similarly, China’s willingness to escort thousands of foreign commercial vessels,
coupled with the PLAN’s frequent exchanges and coordination with other navies in the
region, has paid important dividends for the PLAN’s image as a capable and peaceful
contributor to security in the maritime commons. Finally, just as Beijing faces domestic
pressure to protect its citizens overseas effectively, the PLAN’s deployment sends a signal
to the rest of the world that China is capable of protecting its perpetually expanding assets throughout the world and ready to do so.

Implications for Future Chinese Antipiracy Operations in the Far Seas
What lessons might we take from China’s Gulf of Aden experience that might be applied
to future antipiracy missions in the far seas? First, from the above discussion, it seems
essential for the international community to supply an authoritative legal framework
that supports international antipiracy and other nontraditional security activities of
China and other states. Robust legal institutions not only make Beijing more comfortable with deploying forces beyond East Asia but in some cases they may pressure China
to provide maritime security in porportion to its growing capabilities in the maritime
arena. Second, China appears open to progressively increasing cooperation with other
navies in ways that still allow it to characterize its contributions as independent to
domestic and foreign audiences. While it might still be difficult to integrate the PLAN
directly into U.S.-led multilateral naval security mechanisms, owing to a conflux of ideological, operational, and security barriers, the navies of America and China can look for
approaches that are perhaps less expeditious but nevertheless of value. Admittedly, future far-seas PLAN nontraditional security missions, including antipiracy deployments,
must confront potentially limiting internal tension between decisions to undertake such
operations and what some consider more pressing needs closer to home.35 For instance,
Ma Xiaojun, a professor in the Central Party School’s International Strategic Studies
Institute, states in reference to the Gulf of Aden mission,
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Another kind of objective is to do things in a sound and practical way, doing whatever we
can according to our capability. If you truly have the capability to do long-term escort duty
off the east coast of Africa, why do you not first subdue the South China Sea pirates? The
international community, especially ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations],
hopes more that China will make more effort to crack down on pirates in the South China
Sea region. This possibility is more realistic.36

But if China is to participate in global antipiracy operations, the Gulf of Aden experience
teaches us that it is likely to do so in its own way. China will likely continue to be cautious about its use-of-force policies, especially where the sovereign prerogatives of other
states may come into play. This will limit the extent to which Chinese naval forces will be
willing to compel, rather than simply enhance, security. Nonetheless, the Gulf of Aden
demonstrates that the Chinese approach to antipiracy can make an effective contribution
to international efforts. Additionally, as Chinese naval forces become more experienced
in dealing with unscripted situations, they are likely to continue to become even more
effective at managing piracy within the strict limits imposed by their rules of engagement. With these caveats in mind, there is every reason to believe that in future piracy
hot spots—such as the Gulf of Guinea—China will be an active partner, able to make
meaningful contributions to improving maritime security.
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C HAPTER F IV E

Chinese/U.S. Naval Cooperation on Counterpiracy and
Escort Missions
Zhang Junshe

M

ore than 70 percent of the globe is covered by water. With the deepening of
economic globalization, global seaborne trade continues to expand. As the arteries connecting the world, seas and oceans are becoming more important than ever. The
security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) has never attracted more attention from
the international community. SLOC security is a world issue and a global challenge,
transcending the domain of state or region.

PLA Navy Counterpiracy and Escort Missions
On 2 June 2008, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1816, giving
foreign warships the right to enter Somali waters “for the purpose of repressing acts of
piracy and armed robbery at sea” by “all necessary means.” To fulfill its international obligations, on 26 December 2008 China dispatched three warships—Haikou (hull number
171), Wuhan (hull number 169), and the supply ship Weishanhu (hull number 887)—to
the Gulf of Aden. The ships embarked a team of Special Forces operators from the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy Marine Corps, equipped with attack helicopters.
Since then, China has maintained a three-ship flotilla of two warships and one supply
ship in the Gulf of Aden, assigning ships from the three fleets to the area on a threemonth basis. As of August 2013, the Chinese navy had dispatched fifteen naval flotillas,
a total of forty warships and thirty-two helicopters, to waters off Somalia to carry out
escort missions. PLA Navy warships have provided protection for more than six thousand merchant ships, half of which were foreign ships, including four United Nations
World Food Programme (WFP) ships. In addition, PLA Navy warships have provided
assistance to tens of foreign ships in trouble, recovered four ships released by pirates, and
saved more than twenty foreign ships from pursuit by pirates.

Chinese/U.S. Naval Cooperation on Counterpiracy and Escort Missions
The international community has made joint efforts to deal with the issue of piracy
around Somalia. The military response to pirate attacks has brought about a rare show
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of unity among countries. Numerous countries have sent vessels, aircraft, and personnel
whose primary mission is to conduct antipiracy activities. They are assigned to the following missions: Ocean Shield (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and
partner states), Atalanta (the European Union [EU] and partner states), Combined
Task Force 151 (CTF-151), and the independent missions of Russia, China, the Republic
of Korea (ROK), India, Malaysia, and others. About forty warships from twenty nations are currently carrying out underway counterpiracy and escort missions. Increased
policing efforts by Somali government authorities on land combined with the efforts of
international naval vessels at sea have reportedly contributed to a drop in pirate attacks
in the Gulf of Aden from eighty-six a year to about thirty, forcing pirates to shift their
attention to other areas in the wider Indian Ocean.
The PLA Navy escort task forces have achieved close cooperation with other navies and
organizations. PLA Navy escort task forces have maintained smooth communications
with other navies in the areas of joint escort, information sharing, operation coordination, and liaison. They have conducted joint escorts with their Russian counterparts,
carried out joint antipiracy exercises with naval ships of the United States, the ROK, and
Pakistan, and have coordinated with the EU to protect WFP ships. The PLA Navy has
exchanged commander boarding visits with task forces from the EU, NATO, Combined
Maritime Forces, the ROK, Japan, and Singapore. It has exchanged officers for onboard
observations with the navy of the Netherlands. Countries of CTF-151 share information
with China and other countries during the monthly Shared Awareness and Deconfliction meetings, a mechanism established in December 2008. China also takes an active
part in the conferences of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
As mentioned above, the Chinese and U.S. navies have cooperated well during their
counterpiracy missions in the Gulf of Aden and waters of Somalia. The two navies
have carried out information sharing, operational coordination, and exchanges of
visits by task force commanders. On 25 August 2013, they conducted a two-day joint
counterpiracy exercise involving the U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Mason
(DDG 87), the Chinese destroyer Harbin (hull number 112), and the Chinese auxiliary
replenishment oiler Weishanhu. The Chinese oiler played the role of a pirated vessel as
crew members from Mason and Harbin conducted a combined visit, board, search, and
seizure drill that included a night boarding. Simulated medical emergencies and hostage
scenarios required the sailors to work together to provide a coordinated response. In
addition, the crews demonstrated synchronized maneuver techniques during a live-fire
proficiency exercise, engaging an inflatable target with the five-inch Mark 45 lightweight
guns and 3.9-inch ENG deck guns. The exercise marked a significant milestone with the
landing of helicopters on board each other’s ships.
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This joint exercise represented a big step beyond the first counterpiracy exercise between
U.S. Fifth Fleet and the Chinese navy conducted near the Horn of Africa in September
2012. The 2012 exercise, which involved USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81) and the
Chinese frigate Yi Yang (hull number 548), lasted about six hours and was limited to a
basic visit, board, search, and secure exercise, follow-on discussion, and crew lunch.
The August 2013 joint exercise promoted mutual understanding and mutual trust between the two navies. Mason’s commanding officer, Cdr. D. Wilson Marks, was reported
as saying that throughout the week’s mission, he was struck by how similarly the two navies operated: “‘What my crew found out is they are sailors like we are,’ practicing many
of the same techniques as they confronted the same challenges, he said.”1
After concluding the counterpiracy exercise with the Chinese navy, members of the Fifth
Fleet expressed hope that it would lay the groundwork for closer cooperation in ensuring freedom of movement in the Gulf of Aden, other regional waters, and beyond.
“The U.S. Navy and People’s Liberation Army (Navy) share a common interest in preserving legitimate mariners’ access to, and secure use of, the maritime domain by deterring,
disrupting and suppressing piracy,” said Vice Adm. John Miller, commander, U.S. Naval
Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), U.S. Fifth Fleet, Combined Maritime Forces.
“Both regional and global security environments call for practical cooperation between navies, and this exercise demonstrates a cooperative effort by the U.S. and China to address
common maritime security challenges.”2

The fruitful cooperation between our two navies in the Gulf of Aden is an important
step toward building a new type of military-to-military relationship that is commensurate with a new type of big-power relationship between our two countries.

Notes
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C HAPTER S IX

Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements for the
Twenty-First Century
Christopher D. Yung

I

n the thirty-five years since inaugurating its “Reform and Opening” policy, China has
become increasingly intertwined with the world outside its borders. China is currently the world’s largest trading nation, relying heavily both on foreign supplies of raw
materials for and on foreign consumers of its manufactured products.1 Chinese firms,
answering the call of the government to “Go Out” (走出去), are expanding their overseas investments, and Chinese citizens are traveling the world in ever greater numbers
in search of business, education, and pleasure. Though generally positive, these developments have increased the country’s vulnerability to events beyond its control.
Chinese leaders recognize the increasing challenges of safeguarding overseas interests.
However, official Chinese policy rejects the type of initiatives that would enable the
country to meet these new needs better—namely, overseas basing of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces. In recent years, growing numbers of Chinese commentators
have expressed views favoring revision of this traditional policy, suggesting that in due
time China will have no choice but to take steps to enhance its far-seas support capabilities. This public discussion likely reflects a debate among Chinese policy makers about
how best to protect the country’s expanding overseas interests. If China ultimately does
change its long-standing policy eschewing permanent overseas presence, what basing
model is it likely to choose? This paper will present six possible overseas basing models
and discuss them in the context of current People’s Republic of China (PRC) foreignpolicy principles and objectives. It will then assess which overseas basing model is most
congruent with Chinese interests and draw conclusions about what these facilities will
look like and how they will operate.

China’s Growing Overseas Economic and Security Interests
Economic data from the past ten to fifteen years highlight China’s increasing transnational economic interests. Statistical data from the African Development Bank, the
Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), and the United Nations illustrate China’s
increased trade and foreign direct investment in Africa.2 Chinese trade with Africa grew
more than tenfold during the 2000–10 period (from U.S.$10 billion in 2000 to U.S.$127
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billion in 2010). This makes China the largest trade partner with that continent.
MOFCOM reports that China’s direct investment in Africa “rocketed” from U.S.$490
million in 2003 to U.S.$9.33 billion in 2009. MOFCOM has also reported that of all the
Chinese companies that invested abroad in 2010, 22 percent invested in Africa. The bulk
of these investments went to manufacturing sectors, followed by distribution, farming,
fishery, and construction. The data also reveal China’s increasing dependence on petroleum and raw materials from the Middle East and Africa.3 The Council on Foreign Relations reports that China imports more than half its crude oil from the Middle East and
receives an estimated one-third of its oil imports from Africa. Its largest African suppliers of oil are now Angola, Sudan, the Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and
Nigeria. Lastly, the number of Chinese expatriates residing in underdeveloped countries,
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, has grown dramatically in the past two decades. Erica
Downs of the Brookings Institution has estimated that the number of Chinese expatriates living and working abroad, a sizable number of them in Africa, increased from 3.5
million in 2005 to 5.5 million in 2011.4 As the number of Chinese expatriates continues
to increase, the Chinese government will feel a growing responsibility to protect them
during periods of political instability.5

Public Discussion of Overseas Bases
Despite official PRC policy, which is to deny the need for overseas bases, there is no
question that within China the issue of overseas basing and the stationing of PLA troops
abroad is being energetically discussed. A review of the open press in China reveals that
there is an unofficial line of thought suggesting the need for overseas facilities.
Shen Dingli, a professor and well-known columnist in China, lays out the commonly
accepted rationale for establishing overseas bases: “Setting up overseas military bases is
not an idea we have to shun; on the contrary, it is our right. Bases established by other
countries appear to be used to protect their overseas rights and interests. As long as the
bases are set up in line with international laws and regulations, they are legal ones. But
if the bases are established to harm other countries, their existence becomes illegal and
they are likely to be opposed by other countries.”6 Shen argues that
there are three international relations we need to tackle with when building overseas
military bases. First, the relations between base troops and the host countries. It is possible
to set up military bases as long as the establishment is in line with the host countries’ interests. Second, the relationship between the base troops and the countries neighboring to
the host country. If the base troops can maintain regional stability, it will be probably welcomed by all the countries in the region. Third, the relationship between the big countries
in the world. The establishment of the troop bases is sensitive to those big countries which
have already set up bases abroad.7
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Liu Zhongmin, the director of Middle East Studies at the Shanghai International Studies
University, further develops these arguments.
China also needs to make the international community aware of the fact that overseas
bases are needed for two purposes: China’s own interests and the country’s assumption
of more international responsibilities. There is no need to conceal these goals. . . . Some
countries expect China to undertake more international responsibilities but object to
China’s plans for overseas bases, which are necessary for bearing such responsibilities.
This is unreasonable. Keeping silent is no good for removing doubts. For China, the best
choice is to put the establishment of overseas bases on the agenda as soon as possible, and
carry out the necessary communications with relevant countries.8

Dai Xu, a retired PLA Air Force officer who writes frequently on military and national
security issues, has outlined selection criteria to determine which region and country
should host this facility: “First, we must choose a region where our strategic interests are
important and concentrated and then select a country that has a friendly, solid relationship with us. Not only can our overseas commercial fleets obtain timely replenishment
once we have this kind of base, but our commercial interests in the countries and regions
around our base will also have a stable support point.”9

Six Models of Basing
From the above sampling of the writings of important Chinese commentators, it seems
likely that Chinese policy makers recognize the merits of overseas basing and probable
that they are weighing options for establishing a more fixed presence abroad. If China
ultimately elects to establish overseas facilities, what are they likely to look like? There
are, generally speaking, six models from which to choose.
The “Pit Stop” Model
The “pit stop” model is very similar to China’s current approach to supporting overseas
operations. It represents an effort to maintain military presence abroad without establishing permanent facilities in other countries. Chinese official policy argues the PLA
Navy (PLAN) does not require permanent access to naval facilities or bases in support
of “out of area” operations. In a 2010 China Daily article, Rear Adm. Zhang Deshun,
then Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLAN, stated, “We have no agenda to set up military
establishments, or threaten establishments of other nations overseas.”10 He indicated that
the PLAN “has no plans, nor is there a necessity to establish overseas military bases.”
Other senior PLAN officials have expressed similar views on the subject. Senior Capt.
Yan Baojian, a naval commander in the South China Sea Fleet, indicates that the navy
can operate overseas and conduct its “out of area” missions without any military base on
foreign soil. He further explains that “the naval force can work extensively with China’s
business operations worldwide for military supplies, in addition to [obtaining materiel
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from] advanced supply ships.”11Additionally, in an earlier article, published in January
2010, Rear Admiral Zhang noted the PLAN should continue using commercial supply points to obtain rest and entertainment, food, and water; conduct maintenance on
equipment and ships; and obtain medical treatment.12
The “pit stop” model has the following characteristics: its arrangements are ad hoc; it
does not involve signing access agreements or status-of-forces agreements with the host
nation, PLA personnel having the status only of tourists; services rendered are seen
entirely as commercial transactions; and ships and personnel are given only temporary
access.
“Lean Colonial” Network
A “lean colonial” network includes highly specialized bases scattered remotely throughout the world following the establishment of colonies. Nations primarily develop this
model to fulfill political needs rather than to increase military capabilities. The network
usually comprises bases within a few days’ sailing distance of each other, but these bases
are usually not able to resist seaborne attack. Historically, nations build these bases
to enhance commercial ties with host governments and the local economies of host
nations, to provide commercial bases to exploit the economic opportunities of foreign
countries, and to give the impression to a domestic and international audience of a
global presence. In short, the larger purpose of this model is to further economic and
political interests; therefore, equipping these facilities with military capabilities is seen as
unnecessary.
Imperial Germany’s Pacific base network best illustrates this concept. Germany’s colonies stretched from mainland China to New Guinea. Initially, trading companies helped
to develop Germany’s overseas possessions, without German government support.13 Yet
as commercial interests developed, the German government started to provide financial
support to these colonies.14 These facilities eventually could be relied on to replenish and
resupply German naval units operating in the Far East, thereby extending Germany’s
military capability in Asia. Germany viewed these facilities more as sources of pride
and commerce rather than as viable territorial possessions.15 A “lean colonial” facility is
entirely civilian in nature, largely unprotected by a country’s military, largely maintained
by state-sanctioned commercial enterprises, and able to provide “hotel” or support-like
services for military forces operating abroad.
“Dual-Use Logistics Facility”
Most favorable Chinese commentary on overseas basing highlights the importance of
a secure and stable supply source for Chinese out-of-area operations. Rear Adm. Yin
Zhuo, the most prominent of these advocates, indicated in a December 2010 radio
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interview that China needs a permanent naval base overseas to resupply its ships
contributing to the multinational antipiracy flotilla in the Gulf of Aden. “I believe that
a relatively stable, relatively solid base for resupply and repair would be appropriate,”
Admiral Yin said. “Such a base would provide a steady source of fresh fruit, vegetables
and water, along with facilities for communications, ship repair, rest and recreation, and
medical evacuation of injured personnel.”16
The retired air force officer Dai Xu made similar points in a February 2009 article: “In
order to fulfill its responsibilities to the world, China cannot simply maintain friendly
wishes and symbolic gestures. It needs to have power adequate to protect world peace
before it will be able to shoulder its international responsibilities effectively and develop
a good image. The fulfillment of this duty requires a specific supply facility for the
provision of support.”17 Why is this the case? “Following the bold appearance of China
taking on international responsibilities by [the Gulf of Aden deployment], this type of
escorting and peacekeeping task will become a regular duty. How to execute these tasks
in ever wider sea areas with even lower costs and over longer periods of time is bound
to become a practical issue that will have to be dealt with by strategic decision-making
departments.”18 If China ultimately decides to pursue one or more overseas supply bases,
it will need to decide the scope, nature, and character of these facilities. As the name
implies, this approach involves establishing facilities abroad that serve both commercial
and military purposes.
The “String of Pearls” Model
First articulated in a 2004 Booz Allen Hamilton report for the Department of Defense Office of Net Assessment, the “string of pearls” basing model remains one of the
best-known overseas-facility concepts attributed to China.19 According to this model,
China seeks to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean through the covert and gradual
establishment of military facilities on commercial sites. The word “covert” is used advisedly; part of China’s plan would be to develop these facilities secretly, in order not to
elicit alarm from regional countries. These facilities could be used, first, to assure access
to energy supplies and raw materials; second, to exert Chinese political influence in and
eventually to dominate the Indian Ocean region; and third, to deter the United States
and India from interdicting Chinese shipping from the Persian Gulf. At the time of the
Booz Allen Hamilton report’s publication, some evidence suggested China was directly
involved in the construction of naval bases in Burma, had funded construction activities
in Pakistan, and had invested in facilities in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.20
Other defense analysts later applied this concept to their assessments of China’s grand
strategy. In 2006, the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute published a
report that asserted,
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Each “pearl” in the “string of pearls” is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence. Hainan Island, with recently upgraded military facilities, is a “pearl.” An
upgraded airstrip on Woody Island, located in the Paracel archipelago three hundred nautical miles east of Vietnam, is a “pearl.” A container shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, is a “pearl.” Construction of a deep water port in Sittwe, Myanmar, is a “pearl,” as
is the construction of a navy base in Gwadar, Pakistan. . . . The “pearls” extend from the
coast of mainland China through the littorals of the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca,
across the Indian Ocean, and on to the littorals of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf.21

Some assessments, many coming out of Indian think tanks and defense organizations,
state unequivocally that China is in fact pursuing a “string of pearls” strategy of which
the objective is to dominate the Indian Ocean region.22
“Warehouse” Model
The “warehouse” model, developed by the British in the interwar period, demonstrates
a fifth potential way for a naval power to maintain a fleet far from its home ports. In the
interwar years, the British, after considering their economic situation and war plans, decided that a few ports with large oil supplies and fully capable repair facilities would best
maintain their Far East Fleet. The British chose Singapore as their main logistics hub,
but with war-fighting contingencies in mind rather than logistical reasons.23 This rationale ultimately came back to haunt the British when Singapore fell in 1942. The Russians
pursued a similar approach in the 1970s when they signed access agreements with the
Egyptians for permanent access to a well-stocked, comprehensive base in Alexandria.
A “warehouse” model has the following characteristics: one or two large facilities located
overseas; comprehensive services or “one-stop shopping,” including replenishment, ship
or aircraft repair, and services; and the trappings of a full-fledged military base, including ordnance storage, troop berthing, training facilities, and permanently stationed
vessels.
“Model USA”
The current American logistics model is often considered the gold standard for supporting military operations abroad. The territorial network consists of multiple large bases
that support U.S. naval and air forces and a large number of minor base/port agreements
that allow for flexible resupply operations. In addition to established infrastructure, the
United States maintains the largest fleet of auxiliary ships in the world. This gives the
U.S. Navy unprecedented capability to resupply ships while under way and also allows
for sea-based logistics to support ground operations. In addition to thirty-plus naval
bases and naval support facilities, the Military Sealift Command has ninety-nine ships in
active service that support fleet operations.24 Currently, the United States has a significant base of operations in every major ocean and sea and thus has a logistics system that
can support operations anywhere in the world.
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PRC Foreign and Defense Policy Considerations
Which of the above models is most congruent with Chinese foreign-policy principles
and objectives? To answer this question, it is useful to consider the impact each model
would have on important aspects of current policy. China’s foreign-policy behavior has
remained relatively stable since the start of the Deng reform era. China has generally
attempted to focus on a few themes.25 First, China portrays itself as above hegemonic
and imperialistic behavior. Thus, it rejects such past imperialist practices as establishing
colonies, occupying huge tracts of host-nation land, or placing large numbers of troops
in foreign countries. From the Chinese point of view, its policy is both principled and
nonthreatening to neighboring countries. Second, China eschews interference in the
internal affairs of other states. This principle too militates against establishing overseas
bases or maintaining large numbers of troops abroad. Third, China has long been cognizant of the realities of the international system. Since the early 1990s it has striven to
walk a delicate line, that of assuming greater status and power while avoiding confrontation with the United States. The “peaceful rise” theory and the concept of a “New Type of
Great-Power Relationship” embody this aim.26
With these overarching foreign policy principles in mind, the Chinese leadership must
formulate policies and create military capabilities that address emerging threats abroad.
Given the anticolonialism fundamental to China’s approach to foreign policy, we can
rule out, at least for the near to middle term, the possibility that it will opt for a “lean
colonial” network, “Model USA,” or the “warehouse” model—all of which would require
establishing control over foreign territory and permanently stationing large numbers of
PLA personnel abroad.
Among the remaining three models, which would best enable China to achieve its overseas objectives?
At present, China’s relatively modest overseas operations—connected with counterpiracy
in the Gulf of Aden—are already placing stress on the country’s logistical and support
system. The current “pit stop” model, with its frequent rotations of task forces, its reliance on foreign commercial transactions to perform routine maintenance and repair,
and its absence of access agreements, is proving an extremely inefficient and ineffective way of supporting military operations. Interviews with high-ranking PLA officers
reveal that the Chinese themselves recognize this.27 Moreover, given reliance on foreign
partners for facility security, institutionalization of the “pit stop” model would probably
entail an unacceptable degree of risk.
Accordingly, the “dual use” and “string of pearls” models both would represent significant improvement over the “pit stop” model. Moreover, they would not involve major
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revision to fundamental principles guiding Chinese foreign policy (see table 1). The next
section will discuss in detail their comparative strengths and weaknesses.
Table 1. PRC Considerations When Choosing an Overseas Basing Model
“Pit Stop”
Model

“Lean
Colonial”
Network

“Dual-Use
Logistics
Facility”

“String of
Pearls”
Model

“Warehouse”
Model

“Model
USA”

Significantly
threatens
China’s
peaceful rise
image?

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Poses a risk to
China’s relationship with
host nation?

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Neighboring
countries feel
threatened?

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Helps China
address a
wide range
of military
contingencies?

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Helps China
protect its
overseas
economic
interests?

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Relatively
inexpensive
to execute?

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Likely to
satisfy the
expectations
of ordinary
Chinese
citizens?

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Would be
grossly objectionable to
the U.S.?

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Well protected against
external
attack?

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Are required
transportation assets
limited?

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No
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The “Dual-Use Logistics Facility” versus the “String of Pearls”
The “dual-use logistics facility” and “string of pearls” models share many similarities.
China would use facilities of either sort for both commercial and military purposes to
support power projection farther from its shores. The philosophy behind how China
intended to use such facilities would distinguish the two. The “dual-use logistics facility”
model implies that China would use the facilities as forward operating logistics platforms from which it could support nontraditional security operations, possibly including
special forces operations ashore, to combat terrorists and other threats to China’s overseas interests and citizens. The “string of pearls” model, by contrast, would have China
developing overseas facilities covertly, with the intent to use these facilities ultimately to
engage in major combat operations with India. The best way to determine which model
the Chinese are likely to pursue is to examine thoroughly the physical evidence and the
current characteristics of China’s overseas military operations.
Past analyses have demonstrated that there is very limited evidence of Chinese military
use of the “string of pearls” sites.28 To cross-check these conclusions, this paper examines
the physical evidence to see to what extent “string of pearls” port facilities have military
utility. To be sure, any port facility has some military utility. However, whether these
facilities could support PLAN forces in the kinds of missions and tasks that the “string
of pearls” model assumes is another question. In short, are the current facilities on the
Coco Islands, Hambantota, Chittagong, and Gwadar capable of supporting PLAN major
combat operations in the Indian Ocean region?
Bases supporting major military operations require certain physical features. Table
2, drawn from U.S. requirements for such facilities, provides a general framework for
understanding what Chinese overseas bases would have to look like to be in line with the
“string of pearls” model.29
A close examination of the features of one of China’s major naval bases—Zhanjiang
Naval Base, in Guangdong Province—reveals that it meets most of these requirements,
suggesting that the Chinese employ a similar standard for base facilities.30
Among “string of pearls” sites, only Chittagong meets most of the criteria listed.31 Thus
far, then, there is little physical evidence to suggest that the candidate “string of pearls”
sites are being prepared by the Chinese for future major combat operations in the Indian
Ocean / South Asia area.32
It is also useful to examine current PLAN and PLA operational patterns of behavior to
discern whether the Chinese military is “preparing the battle space.” Examination of the
ports and facilities the PLA is currently using to support its operations in the Gulf of
Aden shows that China is already developing a network of facilities and bases to support
its logistics operations.33 However, these sites do not involve any of the purported “string
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Table 2. Defense Department Criteria for Commercial Port Support for Major Military Operations
Recommended Port Infrastructure
3 berthing spaces 1,000 linear feet each
Minimum water depth of 35 feet
30–45 acres of open storage
4 rail off-loading spurs of 1,000 feet of straight track each
4 rail/truck end ramps
Gatehouse/security
Access to port-owned interchange yard to support switching 2 trains per day
Suitable area to land/service helos (~5 acres)
2 container handlers
Adequate interior roadways to port facilities
Office space with adequate utilities and communication service
Processing area for 30 trucks
Wash rack that meets U.S. Dept. of Agriculture requirements
Terminal Access
Close proximity (<10 mi) to interstate highway system
Access to at least one major commercial rail carrier
Water channel access width of 500 feet and depth of 35 feet
Access to commercial rail interchange yard (if port-owned facilities are inadequate)

of pearls” sites. The ports that China uses most to support its counterpiracy operations
include Salalah, Aden, Djibouti, and Karachi. To date, there is no evidence of a longterm basing agreement between the PLAN and any of its host nations. Furthermore, the
Chinese make only limited use of these facilities. In many instances, China dispatches
a single replenishment ship, which restocks its own stores and then replenishes the
remainder of the naval task force at sea. When other PLAN vessels pull into port, the
duration of the visit is usually no longer than a few days.
For ship replenishment, the PLAN currently relies on commercial facilities in countries
that would be decidedly neutral should China and India become engaged in a shooting war. This behavior does not reflect the behavior of a country preparing for major
conflict. If China wanted to pursue a more significant basing relationship with a host
country, it would most likely repeatedly visit a single military site to accustom its forces
to working with an ally against an identified adversary. Finally, the number of forces
involved in each of these out-of-area deployments remains too paltry (from three to five
ships) to signify a PLAN preparing for major combat against India.34
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No Clear Strategic Rationale for a “String of Pearls” Strategy
An assessment of the strategic rationale for a “string of pearls” strategy strongly suggests
that China would not pursue this approach. First, to pursue the “string of pearls” strategy
openly, the PLAN would need to abandon supposed covert activities in South Asian
commercial ports and then openly and continuously build up its military forces there.
In the process, China would risk the “peaceful rise” image it has studiously cultivated
for many years. Unquestionably, were China secretly conducting such activity, sooner or
later it would have to reveal its true intentions by openly building up its forces at these
“string of pearls” sites. This type of buildup would require a long lead time. China would
therefore have to sacrifice its “peaceful rise” image long before it was ready to dominate the Indian Ocean and take on India in a conventional conflict. Second, because of
geographical constraints, if China stationed naval and air forces at the “string of pearls”
sites, these forces would be highly vulnerable to Indian air and missile attacks. Some
Indian analysts have pointed out that Chinese naval and air forces would find themselves
consistently at a numerical disadvantage to the Indian military, which could, because of
the closer proximity of its own main bases, more easily concentrate its forces.35 Third,
the stationing of Chinese military forces at the “string of pearls” sites would isolate these
forces at great distances from China—making them unavailable for a hypothetical maritime conflict with the United States or one of China’s other rivals in East Asia.
More fundamentally, analysis of Chinese discussion of the country’s overseas interests
reveals that nontraditional security threats currently have top priority. Barring a major
shift in Chinese assessment of the international security environment, this hierarchy of
interests is likely to remain in place for some time. Therefore, we can assume that consideration of overseas facilities will focus on the following military missions: protection
of citizens and property abroad; noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian
assistance, and disaster relief; counterpiracy and the protection of sea lines of communication; and counterterrorism, as well as, possibly, counterinsurgency operations.

The Specific Characteristics of a “Dual-Use Logistics Facility”
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the Chinese are most likely to
pursue the “dual-use logistics facility” model. If China does adopt it, what would this
approach to overseas support look like? Information gleaned from interviews with
professional logisticians and military operators who have experience operating in similar
“dual-use facilities” in the Asia-Pacific region provide some insights.36
Chinese logistics needs will depend on what types of missions the PLA undertakes to
advance its interests. Assuming a focus on nontraditional security threats, logisticians
interviewed for this study arrived at the following conclusions:37
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•• Overseas facilities are unlikely to be heavily engaged in warehousing activities. Instead the facility would likely focus on developing robust and redundant distribution
networks to replace damaged parts easily and quickly.
•• Facilities will most likely develop relationships with local agents, who would work
with commercial vendors like DHL or FedEx and local logistics assets (through husbanding agents) to move materiel.
•• Facilities would likely involve light footprints (a hundred to five hundred personnel).
•• Bases are likely to involve a network that incorporates a division of labor among a
few smaller installations (air operations, ship support, coordination of all logistics
support, etc.).
•• The operating and political conditions under which the facility will be run are likely
to be extremely constraining. The host country, for example, might not authorize a
port visit until forty-eight hours prior.
•• A military base would not need to install sensitive communications or other types of
equipment (weapon systems or radars), since the Chinese could perform these functions at commercial facilities. However, the PLA would need to ensure access to these
facilities by its technicians.

Conclusion
China is likely to expand PLA missions and overseas deployments to protect its growing economic and political interests abroad. To support these missions effectively, China
will eventually need to consider establishing some kind of overseas military presence.
Six possible alternate basing and facilities models exist, but on examination of these options in light of a Chinese foreign and domestic policy filter, only two of the models—a
“string of pearls” model and a “dual-use logistics facility”—are compatible with Chinese foreign-policy goals and could provide the support necessary genuinely to protect
China’s overseas interests.
From the physical evidence, it is reasonable to conclude, first, that there is minimal
physical evidence to suggest that the facilities being developed in Hambantota, Gwadar,
and the Coco Islands will be used to encircle India and support a PLA effort to conduct
conventional war in South Asia; and second, that the operational patterns of behavior of
the PLAN in the Gulf of Aden and in the Indian Ocean do not suggest China is “preparing the battle space” for a conflict in that area. The argument for the “string of pearls” is
rejected because, given what is known about Chinese foreign-policy and national-security
interests, such a strategic calculus appears very unlikely.
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Accordingly, if and when the PRC decides to establish overseas bases, it will most likely
pursue a “dual-use logistics facility” model. China’s overseas bases will be characterized
less by warehousing functions and more by a web of regional distribution relationships
between the base and suppliers. This type of facility will involve a light footprint of
Chinese personnel on the base, will require a distinct division of labor between logistics
hubs in the overseas facilities system, will likely involve heavy use of local husbanding
agents, and will be characterized by dual-use activities.
At such time as China establishes overseas bases or finalizes long-term access agreements to overseas military facilities, the United States–China relationship will surely be
tested. This development would provide both opportunities for military and security
cooperation and challenges to the political influence of the United States and its partners
in South Asia, and possibly outside the region as well. China’s increasing presence in the
Indian Ocean should not be viewed as an attempt to encircle India. Instead, China is
extending its reach into the Indian Ocean region and the Persian Gulf area to protect its
growing interests abroad.
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C HAPTER S EV EN

China’s Evolving Overseas Interests and
Peaceful Competition
Cai Penghong

T

he first phase of efforts to locate flight MH370 ended on 30 April 2014. During this
nearly two-month period, China deployed eighteen naval vessels, thirteen aircraft, twenty-one satellites, sixty-six merchant ships, and twenty fishing boats to search
1.3 million square kilometers of maritime space in the southern Indian Ocean.1 The
operations, which stretched from the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca to the
southern reaches of the Indian Ocean, represented an unprecedented case of Chinese
maritime forces conducting large-scale missions in distant waters.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and the other forces involved in these far-seas
operations were tasked with protecting China’s overseas national interests, actually a
new concept in China’s political dictionary. The concept of overseas national interests
reflects a break with earlier discourse on China’s national interests. In Mao’s time, China
had a revolutionary mission to expand ideology. Now, the country is preoccupied with
concerns for access to natural resources, the safety of overseas nationals, and the security
of overseas investments.
This paper will begin by defining the scope of China’s overseas national interests and
discussing the primary external threats to these interests. It will then examine the basic
principles that will guide China’s approach to managing and mitigating these threats and
present three possible paths that China may follow in the mid-to-long term: the freerider strategy, peaceful competition, and military diplomacy. The paper will conclude by
arguing that the peaceful-competition approach is most likely to accord with traditional
Chinese foreign policy principles and place the country in the best position to safeguard
its expanding overseas interests.

The Scope of China’s Overseas National Interests
China has traditionally conceived of diplomacy as an extension of domestic politics.
Thus, the concept of overseas national interests in the Chinese context should be considered as a continuation of domestic policy by diplomatic means. That is, Chinese efforts
abroad serve domestic development.
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In my view, it is useful to divide China’s overseas interests into the following three
categories: national political interests, national economic interests, and overseas Chinese
citizens’ interests.
Overseas political interests stem from the need for the Party to strengthen its ruling
status and the socialist political system at home.2 These interests are closely connected
with the external political environment, China’s political status therein, and the country’s
role in the process of shaping the international order. As a rising power seeking political
influence and attractiveness (谋求政治影响力和吸引力), China recognizes the importance of working with other states to build new international mechanisms such as the
BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Conference on Interaction and
Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA).3 President Xi Jinping and his team have
resolved to make China a strong power. China can achieve this goal only if it is accepted
by other countries, big and small, remote and proximal. Achieving global acceptance will
be beneficial to consolidating the Party’s ruling status at home. The United States should
respect China’s core interests that involve its political system.4 This is a vital part of the
new model of major-power relations proposed for China and the United States. In Xi’s
view,
China and the United States must find a new path—one that is different from the inevitable confrontation and conflict between the major countries of the past. “And that is to
say the two sides must work together to build a new model of major country relationship
based on nonconflict, nonconfrontation, mutual respect and win/win cooperation for the
benefit of the Chinese and American peoples, and people elsewhere in the world.”5

In the economic realm, China’s overseas national interests include both commercial and
security interests. Since the early 1980s China has carried out a policy of opening up to
the world, and this has led to growth in economic interests abroad. These include export
trade, imports of raw materials, overseas investment, and overseas tourism. In particular, China’s economic development has depended on selling Chinese manufactures to
overseas markets, meeting internal demand for energy and other economic inputs, and
pursuing returns from regional and global investments.
The Chinese government also feels responsible for the safety of Chinese nationals living
and working abroad. Citizens who are working outside China have the right to ask the
government in Beijing to protect them from attacks. In the last ten years this cohort has
increased dramatically, creating a new sense of responsibility for the Chinese government. Whether Chinese citizens are treated fairly while living abroad is regarded not
only as a domestic matter but also as a barometer gauging the extent to which China is
respected in the world. Thus, concerns for their safety and respect have become regarded
as important elements of China’s overseas interests.
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Potential Threats to China’s Overseas Interests
Concern for the security of China’s overseas interests began almost fifteen years ago,
when China initiated its “going out” strategy (走出去战略). The first two or three decades of the new century are expected to be a period of both new opportunity for peace
and development and also of complication, contradiction, and possibly turbulence.
A major source of potential threats to China’s overseas political and security interests is
political rhetoric from Western critics, who suggest that China is translating its rising power into increasing assertiveness. Tensions arising from territorial disputes and
traditional anticommunist ideology or hostile forces (敌对势力) threaten stability
around China’s border. China is depicted as a menace, despite its clear desire to contribute to global peace and security. China, like any other country, makes efforts to develop
defensive weapons systems. However, its systems are labeled as “antiaccess/area-denial,”
or “A2/AD,” weapons, descriptions that depict them as threatening to American ships.
The menacing rhetoric of some American hawks is extremely counterproductive. It
undermines China’s ability to play a constructive role in regional and global settings. The
remarks by the Chinese foreign minister at the ASEAN Regional Forum on 23 July 2010,
though they have been described by Western commentators as “assertive,” received the
support of people all around the country.6
International terrorism, including Islamic fundamentalism and Pan-Turkism, also
threatens China’s overseas interests. Terrorism has increasingly become “a matter of
prime importance” for national security as China presses ahead with its modernization
drive. After the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Central Asia became a power vacuum, creating conditions for the reemergence of terrorism. Moreover,
Central Asia lies along a belt of national/religious friction and conflict that extends from
the Balkans through the Caucasus, especially Chechnya, and Afghanistan. This belt is a
traditional “silk route” connecting China with Central Asia and Europe, particularly the
Caspian Sea oil resources that China demands.
Overseas threats to economic interests constitute the second challenge China will confront in the next decade or more. Economic interests are extremely important, because
they are foundational to many other national interests. Military power, for instance, rests
on the foundation of a strong economy.
To sustain development, China needs secure sea-lanes and unfettered freedom of navigation. China now is the second-largest economy and the world’s largest trading power.
China’s rapid economic growth has come to depend heavily on imported raw materials,
especially oil. Secure sea lines of communication are vital to the shipment of China’s
export and import trade. Any disruption of the sea-lanes or strategic straits like the Strait
of Malacca or the Strait of Hormuz would threaten China’s economic development and
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hamper realization of the “China Dream.”7 Oil imports have increased dramatically since
1993, when China first became a net oil importer. In 2011, China imported about 5.1
million barrels per day of crude oil.8 Oil imports now constitute roughly 20 percent of
China’s total oil consumption per year. About 40 percent of China’s total oil imports need
to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Any disruption to commercial shipping there or
along any other strategically important strait would be hard for China to endure.
Seaborne commerce is now equivalent to over 10 percent of China’s gross domestic
product. Despite the importance of trade to China’s economy, China does not have the
capacity to protect its commercial vessels in the event of a conflict. To be sure, China has
handled, and will continue to handle, low-level threats to its seaborne commerce. Piracy,
for instance, will remain a threat but can be mitigated, because it is a common target.
But some activities conducted by naval ships of the United States, India, and Japan cause
anxiety for China, because Chinese ships, commercial and naval, are sometimes stalked
in the economically vital western Pacific and Indian Ocean. The Philippines is increasingly becoming a source of uncertainty. The United States supports its deliberately
provocative actions against China and has cooperated with it to set up special stations
to monitor China’s ships—developments harmful to China’s interests but that must
nevertheless be tolerated. In April 2014, President Obama visited four Asian countries,
including the Philippines. This trip appears to have been an effort to compensate for
his absence from Southeast Asia during the government shutdown in 2013. It signaled
American commitment to protect its allies in Asia. The Philippines and the United States
signed a new ten-year “enhanced defense agreement” that allows American forces back
to Philippine military bases and facilities, including airfields and seaports. This move
has a very serious geopolitical consequence for China: China must now confront the
threat posed by strengthened American military surveillance of China’s naval ships and
the sea-lanes of the South China Sea.
China also faces threats to its overseas investments. As a newcomer to overseas investment and a state with strong impetus to invest overseas, China has been forced to seek
out investment opportunities in countries with unstable political environments, with all
the risks this entails. For instance, the Libya revolt, which erupted in early 2011, was a
disaster for Chinese investments there. Iran is another risky location in which China has
investments in oil fields. Some Chinese oil companies are desperate to do business there,
but the future remains unstable. Indeed, China is now experiencing a huge loss in Iran
because of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2012, a new sanction
against Iran that also impacts other countries’ financial institutions and banks, including
their operations in the United States.9
To what extent is China able to handle these challenges? At present China does not
have enough capacity to safeguard its overseas interests. China’s political and economic
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interests abroad are insecure. In the age of globalization, the challenges of coordinating political and security interests with commercial interests are harder to overcome.
International financial crises have increased the intensity of political and commercial
competition among countries, particularly between emerging economies and developed
economies. In the view of some Chinese experts, the United States is an envious, declining power and seems bent on putting up a last-ditch struggle for its survival.10 They have
argued that the final struggle made by an injured tiger is the most fearsome and threatening. Others, however, have different points of view, regarding the United States as the
most benign empire ever to have existed.11 The ten-year fight against terrorism and the
2008 financial crisis have had an adverse effect on the American economy, but its hard
power remains unrivaled, and its soft power will continue to be strong enough to attract
almost all countries.
New China (i.e., the People’s Republic of China, or PRC) has existed for sixty-five years.
During this time, China’s conceptions about national interests have gone through different stages. In early periods after the founding of the PRC, China was more concerned
with protecting political power and securing the country from foreign invasion. Now
China does not expect a great-power war to take place in the near future. With that
judgment, China, therefore, currently emphasizes economic development. In the next
decade or more China will continue to experience dramatic growth. To enable this economic growth, China needs to take steps to maintain a favorable strategic environment.
China will meet challenges and difficulties that threaten its national interests. If China
cannot handle these challenges well, it will face the possibility of economic stagnation or
perhaps even some unexpected crisis that will cause grave harm to its interests and lead
to political instability. Obviously, these are not outcomes China wishes to see.

China’s Policy Options
To some, China appears to be an influential country capable of being a regional and
global power. However, given its geographic position facing the Pacific Ocean and given
that China’s territory remains divided by the Taiwan Strait, China is vulnerable. As
China rises, its overseas interests will continue to expand. China’s foreign policy must
adjust with the changing situation. The next decade will be an important period for
China’s foreign policy and diplomatic strategy. How is China likely to respond?
First, China’s foreign policy will strictly follow the Party’s strategy. In 2021, China will
mark the hundredth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. That
will be a significant event for China, because the first Chinese dream is expected to be
realized in that year.12 China’s diplomacy will seek to advance the Chinese dream.
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Second, China’s foreign policy will keep pace with internal development. This means
that it will need to consider how best to serve domestic reform and opening up, with
particular concern for how to ensure development interests and achieve the goal of
building a moderately prosperous society. China is developing quickly and has made
many noteworthy achievements, but China’s diplomacy will remain moderate and
humble. China still has a long way to go to catch up to the level of the United States and
other Western countries.
Third, China will seek out ways to play a constructive role in the changing regional
and global architecture. China will continue to maintain that the world is undergoing
profound and complex change and that peace, development, cooperation, and win-win
outcomes have gathered momentum. However, China will make sure to protect national
interests during this period of change.
These principles will serve as a basic guide for China as it considers how to make foreign
policy serve its evolving overseas interests and its internal interests. As a rising country,
China will encounter competition and pressure from the current hegemon, which, to advance its own national interests, particularly in the western Pacific, will adopt any means
to limit China’s expansion—notwithstanding its many friendly remarks.
In the future, China will need to make a decision about which approach will best enable
it to deal with these threats and serve China’s development interests. There are three
likely models. Ultimately, which model China selects will depend on the strategic vision
of China’s new leadership. The first possible approach is to continue employing the
“free rider” strategy. During the last thirty years, China has gained a lot from the freerider approach. Therefore, it will likely continue this approach to safeguard its overseas
interests. Doing so will encourage China to go farther in its cooperation with the United
States and other Western states. Among the advantages of this approach is that China
will not become a rival to the United States and will encounter less resistance from
outside in its modernization process. The disadvantage is that the free-rider approach
will require China to make some concessions in the areas of core interests and overseas
interests.
Peaceful competition through smart diplomacy is a second possible approach. This
is a less cooperative approach than option number one, but it still may be regarded as
peaceful—acknowledging, though, that peace does not necessarily mean that there will
be no competition or dispute. Peaceful competition is a possible scenario for big powers
that have different approaches to dealing with politics and regional and global affairs but
whose differences do not constitute grounds for war. Both sides have acknowledged the
need to deter weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. For this approach to work, both sides need to be rational, recognizing the undesirability of war. All
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states have their strengths. How to use these strengths to pursue national interests is an
art. States must, through fair competition, use their strengths to find opportunities for
cooperation and to advance their national interests.
The third possible approach would be to increase support for military diplomacy. Some
misunderstand Hu Jintao’s “new historic missions” to mean military preparations for
ensuring overseas interests. They therefore advocate that the Chinese military should
follow China’s expanding overseas interests—that is, wherever Chinese citizens and
Chinese interests exist, the Chinese army should be present (国家的利益延伸到什么地
方, 我们的军队就要保护到什么地方).13 China, like many other countries, cannot send
its military wherever it wants. Instead, it must conduct military and smart diplomacy to
improve its relations with others. Indeed, both military forces and diplomats serve the
same mission, to protect and serve China’s interests. China’s diplomacy should play an
important role in helping the PLA to be pragmatic and cooperative, expanding the PLA’s
participation in regional and international security organizations, consulting regularly
with major powers and neighboring countries to exchange military activities, and enhancing maritime escort operations.
The PLA’s strategic thinking—adherence to the principles of being just, reasonable,
comprehensive, and balanced; standing for effective disarmament and arms control; and
endeavoring to maintain global strategic stability—is basically consistent with China’s
diplomatic thinking. Sometimes the diplomatic environment constrains naval operations
at sea, but at other times the navy’s operational thinking may exert some pressure on
diplomacy. The problem is that China lacks adequate mechanisms to coordinate actions
of different government departments. China’s recent establishment of the National Security Commission (NSC) will give the top leadership greater direct control over security
affairs, enabling President Xi Jinping to coordinate better the civilian and military sides
of the foreign and security apparatus. If China decides to pursue this approach, both the
military side and the diplomatic side must enhance communication and understanding.
That is, the military side needs to consider the diplomatic situation, and the diplomats
should understand the military dimensions of national security. The coordinative and
consultative relationships are essential in peacetime, because each must play a role in
implementing grand strategy.
The expansion of China’s overseas interests is a natural outcome of China’s economic
rise. Chinese statesmen say that China’s rise will deviate from traditional patterns in
which rising powers have tended to pursue hegemony. I believe that if China develops
to the point that it is really accepted as a benign power, it will achieve hegemonic status.
President Xi maintains that China should always be a student, willing to learn from the
experiences of others.14 In my view, China will continue in this modest spirit, remaining
open to study the approaches of advanced countries. China’s pursuit of overseas interests
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will undoubtedly encounter resistance, not only from the current hegemon but also
from an array of countries associated with the hegemon, whether allies, old partners,
or new partners. Therefore, to become a prosperous, developed country, China must be
a democratic, harmonious, and stable country, and its diplomacy must also adhere to
these principles. Only in this way will China contribute to global peace. Therefore, in my
view, peaceful competition is the most preferable approach.

Peaceful Competition and China’s Overseas Interests
China consistently states that it pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and
independent development. This belief in independence at the heart of PRC identity is a
powerful factor influencing which approach the country’s leadership is likely to adopt.
As some have argued, China cannot continue taking the free-rider approach, because it
reduces the country’s freedom of action. According to this view, China, as a great power,
cannot always rely on other powers for its survival. Moreover, following in the wake of
others can only reduce China’s own influence. Therefore, given China’s preference for independence, we can foresee that China will eventually abandon the free-rider approach
to safeguarding its overseas interests.
Peaceful competition, then, is the most rational approach for China to adopt. The approach is peaceful but accepts the likelihood of disputes and quarrels with other states.
Peaceful competition reflects a mainstream value in the international society—that is,
shunning the use of military force and making states that do use force pay a price for
their actions. Peaceful competition is realistic, because big powers like the United States
and China lack the resolve to use military force against each other. They understand that
both sides would suffer intolerable loss in the event of a military clash.

Conclusion
China’s overseas interests include ensuring access to energy resources and foreign markets, protecting the safety of overseas Chinese, and advancing political interests at home.
China’s overseas interests, while expanding and facing some unexpected threats, are not
vital and probably will not become vital but will remain very important in the foreseeable future. Moreover, for some time to come Beijing will lack the capacity to control
the environment beyond China’s border and will find it particularly hard to manage the
situation in the far-sea regions. As a great country learning from others, China needs
time for learning and understanding advanced civilizations and, in particular, generally
recognized and established international practices and laws. China’s policy is to abide by
international law and refrain from using military force. China will continue to seek resources domestically and globally, and because China will choose to remain a part of the
current international system, its actions will not challenge the international community
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by ignoring current international laws and regulations. To safeguard China’s overseas
interests better, however, China’s foreign policy will need to change. The concept of national interest is not a fixed attribute; Chinese policy must change as its interests evolve.
There are several options open to China, but ultimately cooperative competition best
accords with Chinese principles, aims, and interests.
How will Chinese desires to safeguard overseas interests affect China’s maritime strategy? President Xi has repeatedly expressed his desire to build China into a maritime
power. While chairing a group study session of the Political Bureau of the Communist
Party of China Central Committee to discuss a maritime great-power “roadmap,” Xi
highlighted the importance of protecting the country’s maritime interests.15 However, his
first priority will undoubtedly remain ensuring the stability of the internal order.16
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Freedom of the “Far Seas”?
A Maritime Dilemma for China
Jonathan G. Odom

F

or more than a decade, China has challenged U.S. military operations and activities
in and over the waters of East Asia.1 As China has attempted to restrict those activities through national legislation, military operations, civilian law-enforcement patrols,
diplomatic protests, and public statements, the matter has also been repeatedly discussed
during official dialogues and in academic forums. Some American commentators have
pointed out that a rising China would benefit in the future if it embraced the full scope
of rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea guaranteed to all nations under international
law.2 Such unsolicited assurances offered by voices of one nation to the ears of another,
however, might be negatively interpreted as “You will thank me later,” with all the associated implications.
Over the past few years, this author has participated in episodic discussions of this issue
with Chinese representatives, sometimes in an official capacity with Chinese military
delegations and on other occasions in a personal capacity with Chinese academics. During one official event, the author was called on to provide an explanation of the U.S. government’s perspective on the legal basis for military activities beyond the territorial seas
of any coastal state. After that presentation, one of the military officers of the Chinese
delegation approached the author during the subsequent coffee break and joked that he
wanted to hire the author to argue China’s position. This quip reflected a professional
compliment shared between two brothers in arms who each have a responsibility to act
in what they consider to be the best interest of their respective nations. It also showed
that respectful individuals are willing to listen to perspectives that might differ from
what they had assumed to be the only acceptable one.
In other, unofficial conferences and workshops that have included Chinese maritimelaw experts, this author has provided substantive presentations about the U.S. Freedom
of Navigation Policy. A core component of these presentations has been to identify and
dispel a series of common myths about that policy. Dispelling some of these myths has
answered some of the Chinese participants’ questions before they even had a chance to
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ask them. Ultimately, some of these Chinese maritime-law experts came to realize that
a rising China should well consider some of the merits of the American perspective on
matters of law of the sea, as the substance of that position could benefit China now and
in the future. In short, some of the national interests of the United States and China
might not be as divergent on these matters as some in China had assumed. The People’s
Republic of China (PRC) currently faces a major dilemma—it must reconcile longstanding adherence to a restrictive maritime regime in the “near seas” with expanding
interests in the “far seas” that would be better served by a much more liberal approach.3

China’s Maritime Perspective
The sixty-five-year history of the PRC reveals a state with a deeply ambivalent attitude
toward maritime freedom. If anything, the PRC has taken positions reflective of a coastalstate mind-set. For example, China wants to be able to draw straight baselines along its
entire coastline and claim the resulting—very extensive—enclosed waters as off limits to
the ships of other nations.4 Additionally, China wants to be able to draw straight baselines around the Paracel Islands and the Diaoyu Islands and claim even more internal
waters.5 Although China has never fully clarified the meaning of its “nine-dashed line,”
at least one Chinese official has made comments suggesting that China wants “indisputable sovereignty” over the waters within the South China Sea.6 China prefers that foreign
warships not have the right of innocent passage in China’s territorial sea.7 China also
wants to control security in its contiguous zone.8 China wishes that it enjoyed sovereignty of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) equivalent to that which it enjoys over its
territorial seas and internal waters.9 China also wishes that it enjoyed a legally protected
and enforceable security interest in its EEZ.10 Finally, China would prefer to enjoy twohundred-nautical-mile territorial seas;11 that other states enjoyed only a limited freedom
of passage through its EEZ;12 and that other states were prohibited from conducting military activities in its EEZ.13 Taken together, these national preferences show that China
desires to control all foreign activities, especially foreign military activities, within much
of what it calls its “near seas” (jinhai).14
To effectuate control of those “near seas,” China leverages all instruments of national
power, including the law.15 Over the past fifteen years, China has been developing a
strategic concept it calls “legal warfare.” At a 1996 Beijing seminar on international law,
then-president Jiang Zemin urged, “Our leaders and cadres, especially those of high
rank, ought to take note of international law and enhance their skills in applying it. . . .
We must be adept at using international law as ‘a weapon’ to defend the interests of our
state and maintain national pride.”16 Since 2003, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has
been operationalizing the concept of legal warfare.17
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Consistent with President Jiang’s call to use international law as a weapon, one of the
PLA’s official textbooks defines legal warfare to include “activities conducted by using
the law as the weapon and through measures and methods such as legal deterrence, legal
attack, legal counterattack, legal restraint, legal sanctions, and legal protections.”18 The
textbook further discusses “legal restraint” in terms of “shrink[ing] enemy’s political
space” and “restrain[ing] and limit[ing] enemy’s combat operations”—implying that
China should use law to restrain the actions of other nations geospatially, as in the maritime and air domains.19
While China’s concept of legal warfare devotes significant attention to the law of armed
conflict, the PLA textbook on legal warfare expressly notes that the concept also involves
the “international laws of . . . the ocean.”20 Additionally, the textbook specifically identifies domestic maritime laws, such as China’s Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone, which also serve as the “armory of legal warfare.”21
The net result is that China has developed and maintains a comprehensive network of
restrictive maritime claims spanning all of its maritime zones.22 In fact, China is one of
only seven nations in the world that has adopted a “full house” of restrictive maritime
claims.23 This employment of legal warfare is composed of restrictive national laws and
regulations, coupled with a restrictive interpretation of international law.
Strategic use of legal warfare in China’s “near seas,” however, raises several questions. Is
this a proper use of law, particularly international law? What, if any, risk does this strategic approach pose to China’s overall national interests? Does this impact the maritime
rule set that governs China’s “far seas” operations? To answer these questions, it is useful
first to consider the nature and characteristics of the established international legal order
that frames the maritime rule set.

The Rules-Based International Order
While early PRC legal experts derided the existing international legal order as “bourgeois,” modern Chinese legal scholars now tend to recognize the importance of all nations, including China, being led to “understand and abide by the rules of the international community.”24 At the same time, senior Chinese officials have indicated a desire
to make the existing international legal order—presumably including the maritime rule
set—“fairer.”25
While fairness is an admirable and desirable characteristic in many situations, it is also
an ambiguous and subjective concept often assessed in the self-interested eye of the
beholder. Thus, a more objective and realistic goal of all nations would instead be to uphold, support, and promote a “just” international order.26 Although the ideals of fairness
and justness can sometimes lead to similar results, there are objective characteristics of
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the existing rules-based international order that help ensure its justness. They include
the following.
Multisource
The body of international law, including the law of the sea, underpinning the existing
international legal order is derived from more than one source. Of the possible sources
of international law, conventional law and customary law are generally recognized as the
most important.27 Much of the law of the sea is derived from the text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but a significant portion is derived
from customary law.
In many ways, customary international law is a reflection of world history. For centuries, nations have enjoyed freedom of the seas beyond the territorial seas of any coastal
state.28 These freedoms have included, for example, the collecting of intelligence and the
conducting of surveillance by militaries.29 In the three decades since the negotiation of
UNCLOS and its establishment of the EEZ as a new, economic-focused maritime zone,
naval forces of the world have continued to conduct noneconomic activities in and over
the EEZs of coastal states. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of states either have
openly supported this freedom of the seas or have taken no state action (i.e., national law
or regulation) to restrict foreign military activities in their respective EEZs.30
Multiagreement
The body of international law, including the law of the sea, is derived from more than
one treaty or convention. UNCLOS is not the only source of conventional law that forms
the maritime rule set. Another set of obligations arises from the Convention on the
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (the COLREGs).31 As one of
the most widely joined international conventions, COLREG obligates member nations
to ensure that their vessels—both government and flagged vessels alike—operate safely
at sea through adherence to a detailed regime of specific safety rules.32
The U.S. government has demonstrated its respect for the portion of the maritime rule
set derived from the COLREGs in multiple ways, such as codifying those legal obligations into national laws and regulations;33 directing U.S. Navy and Coast Guard personnel to follow them;34 imposing civil penalties against civilian mariners of U.S.-flagged,
nongovernment vessels who violate them;35 setting a leadership expectation that commanders at sea will follow them;36 instituting a robust educational and training program
for its Navy officers;37 and holding Navy commanders and personnel to account for
violations.38
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Intent
The existing international legal order emphasizes respect for the intent of applicable
treaties and conventions. The rules of treaty interpretation state that the terms of a treaty
should be given their “ordinary meaning.”39 If the text of the treaty is “ambiguous or obscure,” then “supplementary means of interpretation” may be consulted.40 Such supplementary means include “the preparatory work of the treaty” and “the circumstances” of
the treaty’s conclusion.
Requiring nations to respect the intended meaning of treaties is understandable and
prudent. Otherwise, one nation or a discrete minority of nations could—after the fact—
upset the will of the majority of states parties to a convention by unilaterally imposing
that minority’s self-interests and, in effect, renegotiating the original bargain long after
the parties have all left the bargaining table.
No formal preparatory work was ever published for UNCLOS. Other resources of the
negotiating history of UNCLOS, however, have been compiled and should be consulted
in ascertaining the intent of words, phrases, and rules that might arguably be ambiguous or obscure. These resources include the comprehensive commentary compiled by
the Center for Oceans Law and Policy at the University of Virginia’s School of Law.41
These commentaries show, for example, that the EEZ concept was intended to accommodate a trend among some coastal states to expand the breadth of their territorial seas
to control more economic resources.42 They also record that the nations negotiating the
text of UNCLOS considered and deliberately rejected the effort by a group of nations to
incorporate a coastal-state “security interest” into the EEZ regime.43 Both of these points
are significant in understanding what UNCLOS says—and does not say—about the
authority of coastal states to restrict foreign military activities.44
Context
The existing international legal order respects the context of applicable treaties and conventions. The rules of treaty interpretation state, “A treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”45 In other words, a nation must
not interpret the words and terminology of a treaty out of context. On a more practical
level, licensed attorneys know they must never argue the law out of its proper context,
lest they instantly lose credibility in the courtroom.46
This principle has been violated by some coastal states seeking to limit military activities within the EEZ. For example, some have argued that foreign military activities in a
coastal state’s EEZ violate UNCLOS, on the grounds that such activities are not a “peaceful use” of the ocean or intended for a “peaceful purpose.”47 These two phrases “peaceful
use” and “peaceful purpose,” however, are found outside the section of UNCLOS focused
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on the EEZ regime and also apply to the high seas.48 Additionally, one of these UNCLOS
articles makes clear that “peaceful” simply means to follow the purpose of Article 2(4) of
the United Nations (UN) Charter and refrain from the threat or use of force. These two
broad-brush, aspirational references to “peaceful” do not summarily trump the intricate
legal regime deliberately established by the convention in its entirety. Moreover, any
reasonable person who reads these UNCLOS provisions in their proper context would
know that these two “peaceful” references were never intended to bar all military activities in the EEZ, much less all military activities on the high seas. Otherwise, all nations
would in effect be prohibited from having deployable militaries.
Multilateral Bargained Package
The body of law underpinning the existing international legal order, especially the portion of the maritime rule set reflected in UNCLOS, reflects a bargained compromise
among many nations. Since taking nearly a decade to negotiate, UNCLOS has been
signed and ratified by 162 of the 193 member states of the United Nations. Some of these
states parties are coastal states, some are maritime states, and some have interests from
both perspectives. The convention reflects a grand bargain among all the states that had
seats at the bargaining table, including the United States and the PRC.49 As in any bargain, no nation at the UNCLOS negotiations received in the deal everything it wanted.
At the final session of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, President Tommy T. B. Koh identified several observations shared among the negotiators that highlight
the nature of the bargained deal. One observation was that no individual nation was
“fully satisfied” with the UNCLOS bargain, as it had been structured to accommodate
competing interests.50 Another observation was that the convention was a “package”
deal; nations were not allowed to follow selectively certain provisions while disregarding
others. In short, no compromise is perfect. The only sense in which an agreement can be
perfect is that one nation receives everything it wants, and then it is perfect for only that
nation—which sounds a lot like the “unequal treaties” of the nineteenth century that the
PRC has forever scorned.51
Transparency
As the UN secretary-general stated in 2004, the rule of law requires measures to ensure
“legal transparency.”52 While he was referring to domestic rule of law, international
law too depends on transparency, in its own special way. Because international law is a
consent-based regime, nations cannot provide informed consent to the official actions
of other nations if those actions and their legal justifications are not transparent. This
sequential process, requiring transparency, is what underlies the long-accepted “persistent objector” concept of customary international law.53

beyond the wall

79

The United States supports transparency about matters involving the international legal
order, including the maritime rule set. Evidence of the U.S. government’s transparency
on law-of-the-sea matters includes the publication of its article-by-article UNCLOS
“commentary”;54 its Maritime Claims Reference Manual;55 its annual freedom-ofnavigation reports;56 and the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations.57
All these official U.S. publications are freely available on the Internet.
Consistency
As the Reverend Desmond Tutu of South Africa once opined, “If we want international
law to hold any meaning,” the international community must begin by ensuring that
international law is “applied uniformly across all countries.”58 In terms of the international law of the sea, the president of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
has reminded the UN General Assembly about the importance of “ensuring uniform
and consistent application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.”59
Similarly, the legal adviser to the United Nations has also emphasized “the importance of
uniform and consistent application” of UNCLOS.60
Uniform application and interpretation of international law arguably include two elements: first, that the body of law applies equally to all nations, and second, that each
nation is internally consistent in its application of the rules of that body of law. In a
speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2010, then–Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
highlighted the importance of this precept with an interesting choice of words—a “just
international order that emphasizes rights and responsibilities of nations and fidelity
to the rule of law.”61 By definition, “fidelity” means a state of continuous faithfulness or
loyalty.62 In terms of international law and relations, “fidelity” could mean faithful and
consistent following of a particular rule set not only when it promotes the nation’s interests but also when that same rule set might arguably undermine the nation’s interests.
The U.S. commitment to this concept of uniformity and consistency in the maritime rule
set has been doubted by some foreign commentators. For example, retired rear admiral
and military strategist Yang Yi from China has asked, “Just imagine if China were to
send submarines into an American Exclusive Economic Zone. America’s reaction would
be even more intense, and it would be all over the major news media.”63 Admiral Yang’s
assumption, however, is mistaken. As recent as the summers of 2009 and 2010, the
United States has not challenged the right of Russian air and maritime forces to operate
in and over the American EEZ.64 More recently, the issue arose again regarding potential
military operations by the Iranian navy near the United States. When the commander of
the Iranian navy threatened to conduct operations off the U.S. coast, a Pentagon spokesman publicly stated, “We’ve been pushing freedom of the seas for years and the Iranian
navy can go wherever it wants.”65 Most recently, the Department of Defense reported
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that China had conducted naval activities in the EEZ around Guam and Hawaii but
emphasized that “the United States considers the PLA Navy activities in its EEZ to be
lawful.”66 Such words and actions are those of a nation that honestly believes in its legal
position on matters involving the law of the sea, to the extent that it does not challenge
the right of other nations to exercise those same rights and freedoms within its own
maritime zones.

China’s Expanding Maritime Interests
To say that China’s relations with the rest of the world have changed in the past several decades would be a gross understatement. Since the late 1970s, PRC leaders such
as Deng Xiaoping and his successors have transformed China’s inward-looking and
inefficient economic system into one that leverages the full productive potentials of
its massive population. With vision and foresight, they have put the nation on a path
of economic success, and the industries and corporations of other nations have begun
to choose China increasingly as their preferred hub for manufacturing. The collective
result is that China and its people have derived tremendous benefits from the country’s
participation in the global economy.
China’s economic ascendance, however, has not come without costs and challenges.
Like the United States in its industrial age of the late 1800s and Japan in the 1920s and
1930s, China depends heavily on its ability to obtain raw materials and energy to fuel its
growing industries. The energy resources located within China’s borders are insufficient
to sustain the nation’s needs. Since the beginning of the new millennium, China’s leaders
have had the foresight to recognize that China must look outward for additional sources
of energy and not to limit that search to the immediate neighborhood of Northeast Asia.
Instead, China has turned to distant locations like Africa, Oceania, and South America,
establishing beneficial relationships with nations in these regions with abundant natural
resources.
These developing relationships between a rising China and these resource-rich nations
are presumably unlike the one-sided relationships that China decries in the “unequal
treaty” era of the past. Instead, the PRC and its representatives have sought to ensure
that these relationships are not exploitative in nature but rather multidimensional and
beneficial to each state party involved. For example, the PRC has invested heavily in improving the infrastructure of many of these nations. Additionally, Chinese corporations
have sent many highly skilled employees to these distant nations to support and train
the host-nation workforces. As a result, a once-isolated Chinese nation and its people are
becoming integrated into the global community. With such global integration, however,
China’s people and interests abroad are subject to more risk and as a result need protection.
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In addition, China, like every nation in the global economy, is heavily dependent on
international commercial shipping. China’s shipping industry both exports its products
to the world and imports raw materials and energy. Advances in the information age
have made world communications virtually instantaneous. Sheer physics, however,
prohibits similar advances in transportation. Ship transits can take days and sometimes
weeks, depending on the port of destination. Problems at any port or choke point along
the way can jeopardize the flow of resources and goods, to the detriment of both China
and other nations. Threats to China’s global shipping interest could impede its economic
success.
Meanwhile, China’s dependence on international shipping places it at the mercy of its
geographic location. China does not enjoy the geographic endowments of the United
States—that is, two borders composed of thousands of miles of coastline and adjacent
maritime zones. Moreover, even with the one lengthy coastline it does enjoy, it lacks the
maximum potential maritime zones afforded under UNCLOS; transmaritime neighbors
like North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Vietnam are also entitled to share in the limited maritime space in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea corridors.
Perhaps the greatest geographic challenge in the maritime domain for China, however, is
the limited number of choke points through which vessels and aircraft can ingress into
and egress from the region en route to and from mainland China ports. To the north is
the Sea of Japan, as well as the straits between the islands of Japan. To the southeast are
the sea-lanes through the archipelagic state of the Philippines. To the south, through
the South China Sea, are the sea-lanes through Indonesia, the other archipelagic state of
the region. Finally, also to the south are the Straits of Singapore and Malacca. In recent
years, PLA military strategists have agonized over strategic vulnerabilities within “the
first island chain” and “second island chain.”67 Also worth considering, however, is that
the existence of these potential choke points makes it necessary for Chinese military and
commercial vessels not only to depart China’s “near seas” but also to operate freely in the
“far seas.”

China’s Maritime Dilemma
One of the benefits of China’s rapidly expanding economy is that the nation has been
able to invest heavily in its military, including in its naval forces. The role those naval
forces will play in promoting, preserving, and protecting China’s people and its interests around the world is driven partly by the capabilities developed by those forces. At
a certain point, however, technological capabilities become less determinative, and the
policies governing how China will operate those forces in particular maritime areas are
likely to determine the trajectory of China’s rise.
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As noted, China’s military cannot protect all of China’s people and interests just by operating in China’s “near seas”; it must operate in China’s “far seas.” Therefore, a nation once
focused almost exclusively on coastal-state interests now recognizes that it has increasing
user-state interests in the “far seas.” China is steaming closer and closer to a potential
dilemma: making the right choice could help ensure its economic rise, but making the
wrong one could impede or slow down continued success.
Consider the following hypothetical situations. What if other nations in the world
decided to follow China’s lead and enact restrictive claims over all of their maritime
zones? More specifically, what if many of the African nations decided, on the basis of a
“security interest” as coastal states, to restrict the ability of China’s naval forces to secure
the sea lines of communication near the African coast? What if all of China’s South
China Sea neighbors, or East China Sea neighbors, or Yellow Sea neighbors decided to
enact comparably restrictive regimes in their maritime zones? What if Japan decided to
enact straight baselines around all its islands, regardless of size, and to claim the waters
within the baselines as internal waters? As China seeks to use its national maritime laws
as a “weapon” to protect its interests, the world could see an “arms race” wherein other
coastal states in East Asia see no option other than to employ the law as their weapon of
choice. What would China do? How would it react?
Essentially, China would have three options, depicted in the figure.
China could uphold the existing restrictions in its “near seas” and comply with all restrictions by coastal states in its “far seas” operations, regardless of the nature and extent
of those restrictions. That is, China could ask permission from or provide notification to
each of these coastal states when its naval forces need to pass through each state’s territorial sea or conduct operations in and over its EEZ. This approach would be consistent
with what China demands in its own maritime zones; if consistently practiced, it could
generate some trust for China in the international community. The drawback, however,
is that some of these coastal states might deny permission or aggressively oppose China’s
operations when notified. Alternatively, coastal states could initially grant permission
to Chinese requests or not oppose them at the time but later decide to withdraw that
consent.
If China did not diplomatically or operationally challenge those improper restrictions, it
would be conceding that in certain sections of the “far seas” China’s military forces could
not protect its national interests.
A second option would be to uphold the existing restrictions in the “near seas” and
challenge excessive restrictions by coastal states on China’s “far seas” operations. The disadvantage of this approach is that China would draw international criticism that it was
hypocritical or following a double standard. For example, China has already drawn some
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Potential Positions for China’s “Near Seas” and “Far Seas” Operations
China’s “Far Seas” Operations

Restrictive
Position

Restrictive Position

Liberal Position

Positives: Increased
control to protect
security interests near
China’s coast; increased
trust within international
community for China’s
consistent position, but
any inconsistent actions
would damage that trust

Positives: Increased control to protect security
interests near China’s
coast; increased mobility for PLA to protect
China’s interests abroad

Negatives: Minimal
respect for existing
international legal order;
reduced mobility for
PLA to protect China’s
interests abroad

China’s “Near Seas”
Operations

Liberal
Position

NOT A VIABLE OPTION

Negatives: Increased
mistrust within international community
for China’s inconsistent
position; minimal respect
for existing international
legal order

Positives: Maximum
respect for existing
international legal
order; increased mobility for PLA to protect
China’s interests abroad;
increased trust within
international community
for China’s consistent
position
Negatives: Reduced
control to protect security interests near China’s
coast

criticism because it challenges the U.S. military freedom to conduct activities in and
over China’s EEZ, whereas China is known to conduct military activities in and over the
EEZs of other nations.68 As China seeks to build confidence among other nations that it
is truly committed to “peaceful development,” such duplicitous behavior could generate
mistrust and doubt from other nations at a critical moment in history.69
A third option would be for China to relax its existing restrictions in its “near seas”
and challenge excessive restrictions by coastal states on its “far seas” operations. This
approach would uphold the characteristics of the existing international legal order:
respecting all sources and instruments of international law, as well as the intent, context,
bargained compromise, transparency, and consistency of the existing maritime rule set.
It also would enable China’s military forces to conduct its “far seas” operations effectively
and secure its interests around the globe.
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From an analysis of these options, it is reasonable to conclude that China’s national interests would be best protected if it adopted a consistent, liberal position on maritime freedom. However, the potential loss of control in the “near seas” will remain a big obstacle
for Chinese policy makers as they consider this option. How have the United States and
other countries balanced the competing interests of freedom and security?

The Coexistence of Maritime Security and Freedom
As outlined above, the one perceived risk for China of adopting a consistent, liberal
position on maritime freedom is the lessening of control to protect security interests
in its “near seas.” That risk, however, can be mitigated via lawful means in the existing
rules-based order.
Make no mistake—a nation may identify security interests in waters adjacent to its land
territory. For example, in a region proximate to American territory (i.e., the Arctic), the
United States has stated that it has “broad and fundamental national security interests.”70
At the same time, however, the U.S. document Arctic Region Policy opens with an overarching caveat that this policy “shall be implemented in a manner consistent . . . with
customary international law as recognized by the United States, including with respect
to the law of the sea.” Regarding security interests of coastal states, the negotiating history of UNCLOS is clear: though a handful of nations attempted to insert a reference to
the coastal state’s security interests in the “due regard” clause of the EEZ, that effort was
roundly defeated during the negotiations.71 Thus, states such as the United States and
China may have security interests in and over the waters adjacent to their respective land
territories, but they must find ways to protect those security interests legally, without
violating the maritime freedom of other nations.
One proper way for a coastal state to preserve its security interest without violating the
maritime freedoms of other states is to exercise its own freedoms. Of note, the freedoms
of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the sea reflected
in UNCLOS are afforded to “all States,” including to coastal states.72 Just as a foreign
military vessel or aircraft may conduct operations or activities in and over the EEZ of a
coastal state, so too may that coastal state intercept foreign military vessels and aircraft
operating in those same areas.73 Consequently, the U.S. military maintains and occasionally exercises the right to intercept foreign military vessels and aircraft, like those from
Russia, that are conducting operations in and over the U.S. maritime zones. At the same
time, the United States is committed to a just international order that emphasizes not
only the rights of nations but also their responsibilities.74 Such responsibilities include
the obligation of all states to exercise “due regard” for foreign vessels and aircraft exercising their lawful freedoms and uses in and over a coastal state’s EEZ. The negotiating
history of UNCLOS shows that the standard of due regard requires all states “to refrain
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from activities that interfere with the exercise of ” other states’ freedoms.75 In particular,
this means nations must comply with other safety obligations, such as those reflected in
the COLREGs, and other internationally developed safety and communications standards, such as the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). In short, freedom of
navigation and safety of navigation go hand in hand. Therefore, the freedoms of a nation
are at risk when a coastal state authorizes, or fails to punish the masters and crews of
its government and flagged vessels for, unsafe navigational practices that jeopardize the
lives, property, and freedom of navigation of vessels and aircraft from other states.
The existing maritime rule set was not dictated by any single nation but rather was developed by the community of nations in a fair, just, and orderly process over an extended
period of history. That is, the maritime rule set was developed deliberately and fairly by
the community of nations over more than a decade of negotiations. The customary-law
component of the maritime rule set was developed over decades—for some rules, over
centuries. Together, this international rule set incorporated the interests of coastal states
and user states, large states and small states, and struck a balance between maritime
freedom and maritime security.76 There is one maritime rule set that applies equally to all
nations beyond their territories. Therefore, every nation must adhere to that rule set consistently and uniformly, including in its maritime zones, in the maritime zones of other
coastal states, and on the high seas. Otherwise, there is truly no international legal order.
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C HAPTER N IN E

SLOC Security and International Cooperation
Wang Xiaoxuan

I

t gives me great pleasure to attend this workshop on the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs). I would like to thank the Naval War College for this opportunity.

The arteries connecting all of the world’s continents, seas, and oceans have become more
important than ever. However, we are now facing a number of problems involving SLOC
security. It is necessary, then, that we discuss and respond to these challenges. I’d like to
share some of my views with you on this topic.
What Are the Threats to SLOC Security?
Threats to SLOC security can be categorized as either natural or man-made. Natural
threats refer to bad hydrological and weather conditions and all other natural risks.
These include hurricanes and tsunamis. Man-made threats comprise a variety of actions,
such as various types of naval blockades and embargoes; threats and attacks launched
by terrorist groups, pirates, and armed robbers against ships and navigational aids; and
accidents (e.g., collisions).
There is a saying, “When confronted with natural disasters, man can react and survive;
but man-made sin is unforgivable.” We do not fear maritime threats or risks from nature.
Human beings have a naturally adventurous spirit and are capable of avoiding natural
disasters. With scientific and technological developments in such areas as shipbuilding,
navigation, hydrometeorological observation, and forecasting, these capabilities will
continue to improve. However, when confronted with man-made security threats to
SLOCs, the international community needs to find an effective response.
Why We Need to Eliminate Exclusive Control of the Straits and Passageways
There are 130 navigable straits in the world, and forty of these are major passageways of
international navigation. These straits are of great importance in the political, economic,
and military sense and therefore are vital to the strategic interests of sea powers.
Both history and reality show that the concept of self-interested and exclusive control,
and the conflicting SLOC security strategies it has spawned, has brought great disaster
to mankind. This, in fact, has become the greatest threat to SLOCs. Therefore, I suggest
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that the international community make joint efforts to eliminate this “control and anticontrol” threat to SLOC security.
The first step toward this end should be to establish the concept of freedom of the sea for
all and to develop and manage SLOCs jointly. Doing so will pave the way for sustainable
development of the world economy and promote the well-being of all human beings. It
will also be in line with the natural property of the seas as a medium of communication
between the peoples of the world.
Second, the international society should begin research on SLOC navigation support
systems. This would lay the groundwork for establishing reliable navigation supporting
systems and regulations based on a security guarantee jointly provided by the coastal
states, user states, and maritime powers. Thus, the free navigation of all the SLOCs
would be ensured around the clock, without bias or barrier, and with certain expectations of support.
Finally, military exchanges and dialogues between the coastal states, user states, and
maritime powers need to be further enhanced. Military-to-military confidence-building
mechanisms based on equality, mutual benefit, and respect need to be established as
a way to promote international cooperation, realize complementary advantages, and
contribute to SLOC security.
How to React to Regional Unrest, Maritime Terrorism, and Piracy
Regional unrest, maritime terrorism, and piracy frequently threaten SLOCs. Response to
them is vital to SLOC security. The international society needs to use political, diplomatic, military, and legal methods and means to manage and control crimes stemming from
regional unrest and conflict and from maritime terrorism and piracy.
First of all, the social origins of regional unrest and conflicts, maritime terrorism, and
piracy should be eliminated. The international society should strive to resolve the basic
welfare issues of the people living in the world’s underdeveloped regions and work to
alleviate world hunger and poverty.
Second, the international maritime security environments need comprehensive management. The United Nations and its specific offices, such as the International Maritime Organization, should make more efforts to maintain global maritime security and enhance
SLOC security, recognizing them as issues influencing international peace and security.
The regional organizations should also be encouraged to play more important roles in
security, including providing security shelters for SLOCs in certain sea areas. International maritime laws and marine commercial law systems should be improved to provide
legal and system support for management of the global maritime security environments.
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Third, “a common but different responsibility system for international maritime security” should be set up. Efforts need to be made to distinguish the responsibilities and
obligations of flag nations and port nations, coastal states and users, and regional states
and sea powers for maintaining ship safety and security.
Fourth, nations need to perfect their maritime control systems and strengthen their
maritime forces.
Finally, I would like to say that China’s economy heavily depends on the development of
foreign trade. The shipping industry shoulders the biggest burden of transporting products and resources to and from China. According to statistics, 80 percent of our foreign
trade by value and 90 percent by weight is transported by marine shipping. The rapid
development of China’s foreign trade and the continuous growth of China’s shipping
market have integrated China with the rest of the world. We increasingly pay attention to
the safety and security not only of Chinese ships but also of the other ships of the world.
Working to maintain the safety and security of sea lines of communication must rely on
long-term efforts from all members of international society—no individual country or
handful of countries can succeed in doing it. We look forward to seeing more effective
cooperation between our two countries as part of a common effort to ensure the safety
and security of strategic sea lines of communication.

C HAPTER TEN

The U.S.-Chinese Maritime Dynamic
Catalyst for Cooperation or Confrontation?
Mark Redden and Dr. Phillip C. Saunders

T

he United States and China have a complex, multifaceted, and ambiguous relationship wherein substantial and expanding areas of cooperation coexist with ongoing
strategic tensions and mutual suspicions. China’s rising economic and military power
raises concern in the United States about how a stronger China will behave. Chinese
leaders describe a “trust deficit” that impedes bilateral cooperation; some of them
believe the United States is encircling China and seeking to contain its rise. Mutual suspicions and the competitive elements of the relationship have deepened in the last few
years.1 One specific manifestation of these competitive dynamics involves disputes and
incidents when U.S. and Chinese military forces are operating in proximity in the western Pacific, and especially when American aircraft and ships are operating in China’s
exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
Over the last fifteen years, a number of high-profile incidents involving American surveillance and military survey platforms operating within China’s EEZ have highlighted
this issue. These include the April 2001 collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3 aircraft and a
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy Air Force J-8 fighter, the USNS Bowditch incidents
in March 2001 and September 2002, the USNS Impeccable and Victorious incidents in
2009, and a December 2013 incident where a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
ship cut in front of USS Cowpens while the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning was conducting operations. All involved aggressive maneuvers by PLAN or paramilitary (Fisheries
Law Enforcement Command and State Oceanic Administration) forces operating close
to U.S. surveillance and military survey platforms to deter the American assets from conducting their missions. The incidents occurred within China’s EEZ, which is international
waters and airspace. Chinese intercepts of U.S. military and military-associated units
operating within China’s EEZ are routine, but the provocative and dangerous nature of
these episodes makes them stand out. In the EP-3 incident, the Chinese pilot’s maneuvers resulted in a collision that damaged the U.S. EP-3 and resulted in the loss of the
Chinese aircraft and its pilot. Each incident raised tensions between the two militaries
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and damaged military-military cooperation. The disputes have become ongoing sources
of friction in the military-to-military relationship.
These episodes have occurred despite a number of tactical- and higher-level mechanisms
designed to reduce the chances of dangerous encounters between American and Chinese
units. Both countries are party to schemes that have codified “rules of the road” and
have established communication protocols intended to minimize the risks arising when
air and maritime units operate in proximity to each other. A number of formal militaryto-military dialogue regimes provide venues to address and rectify the causes of such
incidents. Given that mechanisms exist to prevent dangerous interactions, why do they
still occur? Is it due to shortcomings in the protocols, or is it an issue of compliance? If
it is a compliance issue, what motivates China to deviate from established international
rules and norms? Whatever the cause of the problem, could new or different procedures
or policies help avoid future incidents?
Operational air and maritime interactions between U.S. and Chinese military forces
may appear to be a relatively minor issue, but the ambiguous blend of cooperation
and competition in the United States–China relationship gives them disproportionate
weight in shaping the course of future relations. Similar interactions between American
and Soviet forces during the Cold War occurred in the context of a global political and
military confrontation, a circumstance very different from today’s more positive United
States–China relationship. In that earlier, adversarial context, both the United States
and the Soviet Union endured the loss of aircraft and more than a hundred airmen, in
addition to damage to ships, as an inevitable part of the Cold War military competition.
Even so, the risks of incidents escalating into a broader conflict and a desire to reduce
the operational risks of air and maritime interactions eventually led both sides to seek
agreement on rules and norms for managing dangerous interactions. The result was the
1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), which provided tactical procedures and an
arbitration mechanism that proved invaluable in reducing the number and severity of
confrontations between U.S. and Soviet forces.
The United States and China enjoy a much more positive relationship, one that includes
substantial areas of economic, political, and security cooperation. The two countries
are not global rivals or antagonists. Both sides have strong incentives to seek a positive
future, and senior political leaders in both countries have articulated the importance
of cooperative bilateral relations. If the U.S. and Chinese militaries can substantially
improve operational cooperation at the bilateral, regional, and global levels, this would
have a significant positive impact on the broader relationship. Conversely, if competition and rivalry at the operational level intensify, the repercussions could have a negative
impact that goes well beyond military-to-military relations. In that context, a collision or
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incident that resulted in significant loss of life could be amplified to have a much larger
negative impact on the broader relationship.

Existing Norms and Rules for Maritime and Air Interactions
A first step in identifying why risky incidents are occurring between American and Chinese military and paramilitary units is to determine whether shortcomings exist in the
protocols designed to prevent such incidents. In addition to higher-level formal security
dialogues, such as the Strategic Security Dialogue and Defense Consultative Talks, there
are at least three maritime regimes that provide means to control interactions between
U.S. and Chinese units. On the bilateral level there is the Military Maritime Consultative
Agreement (MMCA), an initiative formalized in 1998 “to reduce the chances of confrontation between the two militaries in the air and on the sea.”2 MMCA’s periodic workinggroup sessions, attended primarily by senior field-grade and junior flag-rank officers, in
many ways mirror the INCSEA working-group format. A key difference is that MMCA
is “vaguer, lacking the detailed ‘rules of the road’ provisions found in the earlier accord.”3
This has produced differing expectations of what MMCA can and should achieve. For
the United States, the focus is primarily on the development of tactical-level deconfliction procedures; for China, MMCA is a venue to address broader political-military
issues.
In addition to MMCA, the United States and China participate in two multilateral protocols designed to deconflict maritime operations. The first is the Code for Unplanned
Encounters at Sea (CUES), a product of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).4
CUES “offers a means by which navies may develop mutually rewarding international
cooperation and transparency and provide leadership and broad-based involvement
in establishing international standards in relation to the use of the sea.”5 CUES offers
“safety measures and a means to limit mutual interference, to limit uncertainty, and to
facilitate communication when naval ships or naval aircraft encounter each other in an
unplanned manner.”6 CUES is voluntary in nature and does not carry the same authority
as an international treaty or agreement; as such, it is not legally binding on participating
countries. CUES also suffers from lack of an arbitration mechanism. CUES specifically
states that “the WPNS will not arbitrate disputes arising from incidents between naval
ships or naval aircraft or from the use of CUES.”7 Responsibility for arbitration is left to
the individual states.
The other relevant maritime program is the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs). Promulgated by the International
Maritime Organization, COLREGs are international maritime rules of the road designed
to eliminate collisions between vessels operating on the high seas. It carries legal authorities not contained within WPNS or CUES.
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For the air domain, the situation is more problematic. Universally agreed and codified
procedures covering interactions of military aircraft in international airspace do not
exist. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) rules are explicitly formulated
for the civil aviation sector and also address interactions between civil and state aircraft (defined as military, customs, and police aircraft).8 ICAO procedures for aircraft
intercepts only cover state aircraft intercepts of civil aircraft; no ICAO provisions address
state-state interactions of aircraft in international airspace.
What does exist is a community of practice developed over decades that provides a
precedent for potential use in the U.S./Chinese situation. The case of the United States
and Soviet Union / Russia, particularly following INCSEA implementation, offers a
good example. “Due regard for the safety of forces” is a fundamental tenet by which
NATO countries and Russia operate when their military aircraft are in proximity. The
need for due regard is most acute in situations where smaller, maneuverable fighter-type
aircraft operate in proximity to larger, less maneuverable platforms (a situation typical
of intercepts of surveillance aircraft and representative of the vast majority of United
States–China air interactions). American officials have occasionally commented on the
aggressive nature of Chinese intercepts of U.S. aircraft, but the sheer number of U.S.
flights and stated intercepts conducted without incident or comment indicates some
degree of acknowledgment and use of the basic tenets of professional airmanship and
due regard on the part of PLA Navy Air Force units and their pilots.9
Despite their individual limitations, MMCA, CUES, and COLREGs, taken as a whole,
provide sufficient clarity to prevent dangerous encounters in the maritime domain by
military and other state assets. The three programs yield a robust set of overlapping
rules and procedures that mitigate shortfalls in the individual programs. They produce a
comprehensive, interconnected set of controls that in principle provide the United States
and China satisfactory tools to deconflict maritime operations. The air domain is less
codified, but a community of practice and a history of compliance with due regard on
the part of the Chinese demonstrate that deconflicted operations can be conducted here
as well. The problem lies not with the rules (for maritime operations) or history of practice (for air operations) but rather in the motivations that sometimes drive the Chinese
to noncompliance with their provisions. Understanding these motivations requires a
deeper look at the two countries’ perspectives on surveillance operations.10
From the American standpoint, military operations (more specifically surveillance
operations) within China’s EEZ are part of a broader military strategy toward China.
The United States seeks to increase cooperation with China and its rapidly improving
military, while simultaneously shaping Chinese choices and preparing for the possibility of a negative relationship. The impetus for this approach comes from the marked
growth in China’s comprehensive national power and limited transparency about China’s
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future military capabilities and strategic intent. Given this lack of transparency, a robust
surveillance and monitoring program focused on understanding the capabilities and,
to the degree possible, the intent of a potential military rival is a reasonable response.
Surveillance and survey operations improve clarity, reduce uncertainty and ambiguity,
and thus work toward reducing risk in a relationship. For the U.S. military, this logic is
an ingrained part of an organizational culture reinforced by decades of similar operations against the Soviet military during the Cold War, although surveillance operations
are by no means associated only with adversarial relationships. Such operations, from
the U.S. perspective, are both appropriate and legitimate, based as they are on customary
international law and the standard interpretation of such key international legal regimes
as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
The Chinese perspective on surveillance operations in its EEZ is influenced by China’s
geostrategic focus, view of potential threats, and mind-set shaped by a history of foreign
intervention. For much of the period since the People’s Republic was established in 1949,
Chinese leaders had a continental focus. Outside of Taiwan contingencies, potential
threats from the Soviet Union and India dominated Chinese strategic thought and military planning. With the emergence of the Taiwan independence movement, economic
development of China’s southeast coast, and changes in the global geopolitical environment starting in the 1990s, China shifted its strategic military focus away from continental defense and toward defense of its maritime and air approaches in the western Pacific.
These approaches, in and through China’s EEZ, were now considered more critical to the
nation’s security than they had been before.
Territorial integrity and sovereignty carry significant weight in the political psyche
of Chinese leaders and of the population writ large. One legacy of China’s “century
of humiliation”—a period in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries marked by
frequent foreign intervention—is an acute sensitivity to real or perceived threats to
Chinese sovereignty. U.S. surveillance operations in China’s EEZ are interpreted in this
context, as encroachments on Chinese sovereignty and threats to national security. The
Chinese have instituted a multifaceted response, which includes harassment of select
U.S. military assets, legal maneuverings (promoting a different interpretation of portions of UNCLOS and applying domestic laws to these air and maritime regions), and
a strategic communications campaign with domestic and international components.
The Chinese argue that American surveillance operations in the western Pacific are not
consistent with a cooperative, mutually beneficial bilateral relationship and are a relic of
an adversarial Cold War mentality that has no place in the present United States–China
relationship.
The contrast in perspectives could not be starker. For the United States, surveillance
and military survey operations are routine, nonthreatening, legal, and appropriate. For
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China, they are hostile, threatening, illegal, and inappropriate. China’s harassment of
U.S. naval vessels and aircraft conducting surveillance and survey operations is intended
to reinforce these concerns and produce a change in American behavior by raising the
costs and risks of such operations. This is a classic example of what Thomas Schelling
described as a “threat that leaves something to chance,” where one actor uses the possibility of an accident or incident as a means of shaping and deterring the other actor’s
unwanted behavior.11 China views the United States as more concerned than China
about the safety of its personnel (and thus more risk averse), and it regards the risk of a
collision or incident escalating into a major conflict as limited and acceptable. As one
PLA officer stated in a dialogue with American counterparts in Beijing in March 2011,
“We care about the safety of our people, but we care about national security more.” This
logic explains Chinese willingness to disregard established rules and norms for maritime
and air interactions and the ineffectiveness of appeals to mutual concern for the safety of
sailors and airmen.

Factors behind the U.S.-Soviet INCSEA Agreement
Despite the very different political context of U.S.-Chinese relations, the example of
how the United States and Soviet Union handled this issue may provide insight into the
factors that prompt states to decide to manage dangerous air and maritime interactions.
Military incidents began during the concluding days of World War II and remained
prominent features of the Cold War until the implementation of INCSEA in 1972. Over
this period, dangerous interactions between U.S. and Soviet forces had two distinct
phases, demarcated by changes in the power-projection capabilities and operational patterns of Soviet military forces. The first phase (1945–60) was dominated by interactions
within the air domain.12 Air incidents were direct results of U.S. intelligence initiatives
to monitor Soviet military developments during a period of increasing Cold War tension. American collection operations included both photo- and electronic-intelligence
missions conducted along the periphery of the Soviet Union and, for a period of time,
within Soviet airspace. Additional U.S.-Soviet incidents came about as a result of the
Korean War.13 In total, more than a hundred American and Soviet airmen were lost as a
result of these incidents.14 Maritime interactions were less prominent during this phase,
owing to the coastal nature of the Soviet navy and the limitations of its overall capabilities, which were significantly inferior to those of the U.S. Navy. By the early 1960s the
balance between air and maritime incidents began to shift toward a greater number of
dangerous maritime encounters. This dynamic was driven by enhanced Soviet navy
capabilities (including the introduction of intelligence collection ships, known as AGIs,
into the Soviet inventory starting in the 1950s), more out-of-area deployments, and
increased Soviet maritime commercial activity (including a large Soviet fishing fleet
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operating near the United States and increased Soviet merchant activity to and from
Cuba).15 The eventual elimination of direct overflights of Soviet territory by U.S. aircraft
and the growing relevance and use of space-based reconnaissance assets contributed to
the decreased frequency and severity of air incidents.
The general pattern of increasingly dangerous maritime interactions continued throughout the 1960s, growing proportionally with the expanding reach and capabilities of
the Soviet navy. Growing concern over the severity and escalatory potential of these
incidents eventually led the United States to propose talks with the Soviets to address the
problem and seek resolution. Initial efforts were rebuffed, but American statements of
concern were among a number of factors that led to a marked downturn in the number
of maritime incidents starting in late 1968 and lasting throughout 1969.16 This positive
development proved short-lived, as the pace of dangerous and provocative interactions
increased again in 1970. Starting with the Soviet navy’s Okean 70 exercise, a large-scale
exercise involving over two hundred Soviet vessels in multiple locations participating
in simulated war-fighting scenarios, harassment incidents, aggressive maneuvering,
and intelligence-collection operations by both countries were once again on the rise.17
However, rather unexpectedly (from the American perspective), in late 1970 the Soviets
finally acceded to U.S. desires to discuss these incidents at sea.18
Three issues motivated both sides to seek agreement: heightened concern over the
escalation potential of future incidents, a growing parallelism in the nature and scope
of each side’s surveillance operations, and a burgeoning détente between the United
States and Soviet Union. While there is insufficient information to determine the precise
weighting of these factors in driving the two sides toward mutual restraint, available
evidence suggests that escalation control was likely the most important. Mutual restraint was especially important given the zero-sum and global nature of U.S.-Soviet
geopolitical competition (occurring against a backdrop of rapidly expanding nuclear
arsenals), a competition that produced a tightly coupled system wherein an incident in
one area could escalate into a broader confrontation or provoke a response in a different geographic or functional area. By the early 1970s the United States and the Soviets
had developed a shared appreciation of the potential negative consequences of military
incidents, including the risk of escalation to the nuclear level. These parallel interests developed despite the ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union
and associated intense military competition.
A number of factors contributed, in turn, to a common understanding of the escalation potential. First was the shift from air incidents to maritime incidents. Despite
the seriousness of the air incidents in the 1940s and 1950s, both sides appear to have
concluded that their escalation potential was minimal. Air incidents typically involved a
small number of aircraft operating in known geographic locations. Moreover, pilots on
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both sides were under direct and constant command of ground controllers. These conditions allowed both sides time for rational decision making, which reduced the escalation
potential. However, as both sides came to realize in the late 1960s and early 1970s, these
conditions did not necessarily apply in the more crowded maritime domain. The previously mentioned Okean 70 exercise demonstrated the potential for large concentrations
of U.S. and Soviet maritime forces to operate close to each other. Individual incidents,
which were growing in frequency and severity throughout the run-up to INCSEA, might
not remain isolated but could instead spill over and draw in nearby military forces. Tactical and operational dynamics in the maritime domain could produce rapid escalation
that decision makers on both sides might not be able to control. Moreover, the expanded
global presence of the Soviet navy meant that such incidents might occur anywhere in
the world. Increasingly, the key for the United States and Soviet Union was not in isolating incidents but in developing means to prevent them.
The rise of concerns about maritime incidents was exacerbated by the expanding combat
power of the Soviet navy, which increased the potential escalation consequences and
may have emboldened the Soviet navy during encounters with the U.S. Navy. At the
same time, David Winkler cites this narrowed gap in capabilities as a factor allowing the
Soviet navy to engage in INCSEA negotiations on a more even footing.19
A third issue heightening concern about escalation was Soviet trepidation over the
ability of inexperienced ship commanders to operate in proximity to U.S. Navy units
when deployed far from home. During INCSEA negotiations, a Soviet interpreter stated
privately that “Soviet naval leaders worried that some of these young officers did not
possess the maturity or the ship-handling skills required for command, and this could
lead to undesirable consequences.”20 The interpreter went on to state that “this underlying concern explained the Soviet decision to accept the long-standing American offer
to implement some controls.”21 These three issues heightened Soviet concerns that a
maritime incident could escalate into an unwanted broader confrontation or conflict.
At the same time, growing parallelism in the surveillance operations conducted by both
countries and the détente of the early 1970s demonstrated that mutual military restraint
could produce tangible benefits. In the early phases of the Cold War the United States
possessed a decided advantage in the ability to collect air and maritime intelligence. The
United States had access to an extensive network of European and Asian bases, while
Soviet basing options were constrained. The coastal nature of the Soviet navy precluded
it from conducting extended, out-of-area intelligence missions against the United States
or its military forces. This dynamic began to change in the late 1950s and early 1960s,
owing primarily to increasing Soviet inventories of AGIs and Tu-95 Bear aircraft. Soviet
intelligence-collection missions off both coasts of the United States, within North
American air-defense identification zones, and against U.S. maritime forces deployed
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around the world became commonplace in the run-up to INCSEA, and in many ways
they mirrored U.S. intelligence-collection missions. The Soviet collection missions
presumably provided valuable intelligence on American military capabilities and intentions. However, the Soviet forces conducting these missions were just as vulnerable to
U.S. harassment as were American surveillance units operating in and around the Soviet
Union and against Soviet forces in distant areas. Increased parity in the scope and nature
of each side’s intelligence-collection missions and the mutual vulnerability of collection
assets produced a common interest in behavioral norms that reduced operational risk
while allowing both sides to continue valuable collection activities.
The final major causal factor favoring agreement between the United States and Soviet
Union was a modest improvement developing in the broader political relationship between the countries. The period of INCSEA negotiations saw the signing of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty and agreement between the United States and the Soviet
Union to begin bilateral discussions on nuclear arms limitations. An agreement covering
incidents at sea followed these breakthroughs and contributed to this positive political
momentum.
Winkler highlights two lesser but not insignificant issues that may also have contributed to Soviet interest in INCSEA. First was the vulnerability of the expanding Soviet
commercial fleet. Despite its vast increase in quantity and quality in the 1960s, the
Soviet navy still lacked the ability to deter the U.S. Navy from monitoring, tracking, and
potentially interdicting Soviet commercial vessels around the world. Codifying norms
of behavior in international waters and airspace would afford the Soviets some degree
of protection from potential harassment by U.S. forces. The Soviet navy may also have
derived domestic benefit from INCSEA, in the form of service prestige and political
influence, as a result of its formal relationship with the U.S. Navy. As the only branch of
the Soviet military to have such contact with its American counterpart, it could lay claim
to being a nominal equal to the U.S. Navy, bolstering its position vis-à-vis the other
branches of the Soviet military in the competition for resources.

Comparison between U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese Military Encounters
As noted, the U.S.-Soviet Cold War relationship and the contemporary U.S.-Chinese
relationship are very different, most notably in the absence of a global zero-sum competition between the United States and China and a much lower risk of military incidents
escalating into broader conflicts. Notwithstanding, the potential economic and political
consequences of U.S.-Chinese incidents are more pronounced than in the Cold War
case. Nevertheless, there is value in examining similarities and differences between the
two cases with an eye to how they affect incentives and behavior. We focus on six factors:
perceived risk of escalation, the degree of parallelism in surveillance operations, the

104

china maritime studies

political context of military competition, the relative capabilities of the respective militaries, interservice rivalry and civil-military relations, and the importance of commercial
shipping.
Perceived Risk of Escalation. Judged objectively in context of the broad U.S.-Chinese relationship, the dangerous military encounters considered in this paper have a much lower
risk of escalating into a broader military conflict (much less a nuclear conflict) than
did U.S.-Soviet incidents during the Cold War. U.S.-Chinese air and maritime incidents
have been much less severe, whether measured in terms of loss of life, loss of aircraft,
or damage to ships. There is no clear trend toward increasing severity of incidents.
(Open-source information does not permit a judgment about trends in the frequency of
incidents or close calls.) Maritime incidents involving China have a somewhat different
character, in that there are fewer navy-to-navy incidents and more interactions involving
Chinese paramilitary assets. The relatively limited losses make the risks in the current
situation more tolerable to China.
Geographic differences also reduce escalation risk. At present, dangerous U.S.-Chinese
military interactions are geographically limited, occurring mainly in China’s EEZ or
nearby waters (e.g., the Yellow Sea). Conversely, interactions between the U.S. and
Chinese navies in distant waters, such as during counterpiracy operations in the Gulf
of Aden, have been cooperative and professional. This contrasts with Cold War incidents, which were initially limited to areas around the Soviet Union but became global
as the Soviet navy’s exercises and operational deployments expanded and were equally
contentious in all areas. The underlying Cold War political competition, the clash of
ideologies, and the struggle for dominance between two opposed political systems had
no geographic bounds. It is unclear whether top Chinese civilian and military leaders
share Soviet concern about the increased escalation risks caused by inexperienced commanders and crews operating in distant waters. The cautious, step-by-step approach the
PLAN has taken to extraregional deployments may reflect concern about the quality of
naval commanders, but thus far the pace and scope of deployments have been limited
enough to allow handpicking of captains and crews.22 If PLAN extraregional deployments increase significantly, there may be more concern about proficiency of, and the
potential for less control (and thus greater escalation risk) over, naval assets deployed far
from China’s coasts. But at present, these deployments are in cooperative settings where
the risk of dangerous incidents with the American military is minimal.
Common concerns about the risks of escalation (and the importance of reducing that
risk) do not presently exist in the U.S.-Chinese situation to the degree necessary to
induce mutual restraint. Not only are the number and severity of current incidents much
less than in the Cold War, but American concern about the potential for escalation is
much more pronounced than it is for the Chinese. However, in addition to traditional
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issues of escalation, both the United States and China have much to lose if a military
incident turns into a major bilateral political issue that damages U.S.-Chinese economic
and international cooperation. Nevertheless, the Chinese appear to judge that this risk
too is acceptably small.23
Parallelism in Surveillance Operations. Although China has and employs air and naval
surveillance assets, it has only a limited ability to duplicate U.S. maritime and air surveillance operations and lacks the ability to monitor American maritime activities on a
global basis. This mismatch in operational capabilities means the United States benefits
more than does China from the lack of restrictions on such activities and that China
sees limited value in accepting U.S. surveillance activities in its EEZ, because it is less
able to undertake parallel, reciprocal operations that might yield equal dividends. This
mismatch hinders the ability of both sides to reach consensus on the legitimacy and appropriateness of the operations.
Political Context of Military Competition. This category consists of three elements: the
nature of the military-to-military relationship, the influence of nationalism on security
decision making, and the ability of the respective militaries to address operational issues
separate from broader political considerations. In terms of the “mil-to-mil” relationship, the United States–China case has more cooperative elements than the United
States–Soviet Union relationship. There is no Cold War parallel to such cooperative U.S.
Navy/PLAN endeavors as counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, joint exercises,
port visits, or personnel exchanges. This cooperation is a potential foundation on which
to pursue agreement over military encounters on the high seas and in international
airspace. Although both the United States and China seek to maintain a stable relationship, most observers see the competitive elements of the relationship as increasing faster
than the cooperative side. The opposite was true in the U.S.-Soviet relationship before
INCSEA, where détente encouraged a new emphasis on cooperating in pursuit of common interests (such as nonproliferation) and finding ways of managing competition.
Nationalism, with its potential impact on decision makers, also differs greatly between
the two cases. In the U.S.-Chinese situation, perceived American encroachments on Chinese sovereignty have produced nationalistic calls from the Chinese public and military
for tougher responses. This pressure provides the PLA and Chinese decision makers
incentives to take hard rhetorical positions on the issue and makes compromise more
difficult. The Cold War produced a very different dynamic, with Soviet leadership more
concerned about the potential for inducing a “rally around the flag” sentiment within the
American population as a result of its harassment activities.24 In that case, the potential
influence of nationalism on domestic populations favored compromise.
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Regarding the ability to separate military and political issues, China has been unwilling to decouple the specific military issue of EEZ operations from overarching political
issues. Unlike the Soviets, China remains steadfast in linking specific military issues to
the broader political context; this has made it impossible for the MMCA to agree on
operational procedures that work around underlying political disputes. This may partly
be a function of the importance of sovereignty in the Chinese context. The issue is not
more or less effective counterintelligence; rather, it is tied up with Chinese conceptions
of the importance of sovereignty and the PLA’s special role in defending that sovereignty.
Chinese strategic culture favors a top-down approach to security issues. Chinese officials
repeatedly emphasize that a mutually beneficial political environment is a precondition
for dealing with contentious military issues.25 The United States, its perceptions colored
by experience during the Cold War, believes that a bottom-up approach focused on
common interests remains viable and that solutions to difficult military problems can be
achieved despite broader, irresolvable political disputes.
Relative Military Capabilities. With its naval modernization efforts and development
of shore-based antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, China is reducing the U.S.
military advantage, but this effect is geographically limited to waters near China. The
PLAN’s shift from a purely coastal navy to a force with more-potent regional capabilities mirrors the increased Soviet emphasis on maritime capabilities starting in the
1950s.26 The current situation roughly resembles the Cold War circa the early 1960s,
with a somewhat more active Chinese regional naval presence. Improvements in PLAN
capabilities have not created the relative balance that existed between the U.S. and Soviet
navies in the immediate run-up to INCSEA.
Interservice Rivalry and Civil-Military Relations. The INCSEA agreement arguably raised
the Soviet navy’s status and clout in interservice politics and was compatible with the civilian emphasis on détente. However, it is not clear that the PLAN and Chinese paramilitary forces would derive similar benefits from an agreement. The opposite is likely true:
the frontline role of the navy and paramilitary forces in defending Chinese sovereignty is
a source of clout in interservice debates, generates public support, and justifies increased
resources for naval modernization.
Importance of Commercial Shipping. China is much more dependent on ocean-borne
commerce than the Soviet Union ever was. China’s foreign trade was 47 percent of
gross domestic product in 2012, and China has become the world’s largest exporter and
second-largest importer.27 Some 80–90 percent of this trade is carried by ship.28 Chinese
writers acknowledge the potential vulnerability of Chinese merchant shipping (and of
China-bound third-party shipping) to piracy, terrorist action against choke points, or
interdiction. Chinese national-security writings acknowledge that PLAN capabilities
are insufficient to protect Chinese sea lines of communication and cite this as a strategic
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vulnerability. However, the United States does not monitor and track Chinese commercial vessels as it did Soviet vessels, and the American policy emphasis on freedom of
navigation means the U.S. Navy does not harass or threaten Chinese merchant ships.
The three most important factors that contributed to Soviet interest in an INCSEA
agreement (concerns about escalation risk, broadly parallel air and maritime intelligence
and surveillance operations, and warming political relations) do not presently exist in
the U.S.-Chinese situation to the degree necessary to induce mutual restraint in maritime and air interactions within China’s EEZs and nearby waters. The interservice and
civil-military benefits the Soviet navy derived from negotiating an INCSEA agreement
with its American counterpart are absent (or even reversed) in the China case. The
narrow geographic focus of U.S. operational disputes with China and the limited scope
of Chinese out-of-area and surveillance operations also pose challenges for creating
parallel interests that support operational restraint. Some of these factors are likely to
change over the next ten to fifteen years as Chinese global economic interests and naval
modernization efforts produce a larger, more capable PLAN that is more active inside
and outside the region. However, waiting for Chinese interests and attitudes to change is
not an attractive solution, given the potential for a military incident to damage bilateral
relations badly.
There are also some positive factors that were absent in the U.S./Soviet Cold War case.
First, the U.S.-Chinese relationship has many more positive and cooperative elements,
including deep economic interdependence, a degree of strategic cooperation on global
and regional security issues, and extensive social, educational, cultural, and societal ties.
Both countries have a lot to lose if military competition intensifies and damages this
cooperation. Second, the United States and China are not engaged in a global, zero-sum
ideological competition; bilateral disputes are narrower and more functionally or geographically focused. The limited geographic scope of disputes may provide opportunities
for creative approaches. Third, China is more integrated into the global economy and
more dependent on maritime trade than the Soviet Union ever was; this produces common interests in freedom of navigation, protecting maritime commerce, and keeping sea
lines of communication open (even if the two countries disagree about some aspects).
Fourth, China is more concerned about projecting a positive and cooperative international image.

The Chinese Calculus on EEZ Issues
The foregoing analysis suggests that American policy makers cannot mechanically apply lessons from negotiating the INCSEA agreement with the Soviet Union to current
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disputes with China over air and maritime operations. If the problem is selective Chinese noncompliance with international rules and norms in order to advance nationalsecurity interests, American policy makers need to understand the underlying Chinese
policy calculus, how it may change over time, and potential means of influencing that
calculus to produce different behavior. Otherwise, disparities in risk calculations and the
lack of parallel interests are likely to embolden the PLA and Chinese paramilitary forces
to continue aggressive behavior within China’s EEZ.
While the Cold War factors may be of only limited use in the present U.S.-Chinese situation, it may still be possible to structure parallel interests in ways that support mutual
restraint. The primary hurdle is China’s perceived sovereignty and national-security concern stemming from the U.S. operations in its EEZ. Assuming the United States will continue these operations, the success of any initiative will depend on reducing or offsetting
this concern. Doing so will require approaches that either moderate Chinese sovereignty
and security concerns or offset them by raising the weight of other strategic factors in
the overall Chinese decision-making calculus on EEZ military operations. (The Chinese
calculus is also likely to change independently over time as the nation’s overseas interests
continue to grow and PLA operational activities expand.)
On the basis of Chinese policy objectives, official statements, patterns of behavior, and
logical inferences based on specific military surveillance operations, our analysis identifies seven decision-making variables. In addition to the sovereignty/security concerns
discussed above, the variables are intelligence/counterintelligence, geostrategic political
considerations, PLA domestic factors, global-commons access, escalation control, and
impact on United States–China relations. Although an ideal model should indicate the
relative weights of these factors, that would be difficult, because of the opaqueness of
Chinese decision making. We therefore employ a simple binary model (see the table)
that identifies variables and examines whether they offset or reinforce China’s sovereignty concerns.
Intelligence/Counterintelligence. This variable captures how formal international rules
and informal norms of behavior affect China’s ability to gather needed strategic and
tactical intelligence and to limit the ability of potential adversaries to collect intelligence.
The ideal circumstance for China would involve permissive rules for Chinese operations and restrictive rules for others’ operations in China’s EEZ or other sensitive areas.
PLA officers have expressed particular concern about U.S. efforts to use air and naval
surveillance to collect “battlefield intelligence” on PLA capabilities and the operational
environment in the western Pacific. Given the gap in American and Chinese military
capabilities, the PLA has strong incentives to deny the U.S. technical intelligence on such
systems as submarines, air defenses, and advanced electronic-warfare systems. At the
same time, China needs to collect information on the military capabilities of potential
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Variables in China’s Calculus on EEZ Activities
Variable

Impact on Chinese Sovereignty/
Security Concerns

Relative Weight

Sovereignty concerns

Same

High

Intelligence/counterintelligence

Reinforces

Medium

U.S. role in Asia

Reinforces

Medium

Stable external environment

Moderates

High, but EEZ operations have
limited impact

Shape rules and norms

Reinforces

Low

Positive Chinese image

Moderates

Medium, but EEZ operations have
limited impact

PLA domestic factors

Mixed

High

Global-commons access

Moderates

High, but EEZ operations have
limited impact

Escalation control

Moderates

High, but EEZ operations have
limited impact

U.S.-Chinese relations

Moderates

High, but EEZ operations have
limited impact

Geostrategic political
considerations

adversaries and on the operational environment, including in disputed waters and in the
EEZs of other countries. This need will likely grow over time as PLAN operational activity increases and expands in geographic scope.
Geostrategic Considerations. This variable encompasses at least four aspects. The first
involves China’s attitude toward the American strategic role in Asia. Despite Chinese assurances that it accepts the United States as an “Asia-Pacific power” and does not oppose
U.S. alliances “if they are not aimed against China,” many Western analysts believe that
China’s long-term objective is to erode American influence in Asia. Successful Chinese
efforts to constrain the U.S. military’s ability to operate in an A2/AD environment could
reduce U.S. regional influence and loosen bonds between the United States and its
regional allies and partners. This would enhance China’s ability to achieve its regional
objectives, including favorable settlement of territorial disputes in the South and East
China Seas.
A second consideration involves China’s need for a stable external environment that
allows a continued focus on domestic economic and social development. China values
cooperative external relationships and a positive public image as helping ensure that
external issues do not disrupt internal progress. Aggressive efforts to challenge U.S. military operations in the western Pacific risk unsettling the regional security environment
and reducing China’s ability to focus on internal development.
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A third consideration involves China’s broad desire to shape international rules and
norms. China has benefited immeasurably from most of the rules and norms in the
current international system, but some Chinese leaders and scholars want to modify
some existing rules and norms to serve Chinese interests better. Efforts to articulate and
enforce China’s position on what military operations are appropriate and legal within
EEZs are consistent with this perspective.
A fourth consideration involves China’s efforts to project a positive international image
as a responsible power that is making positive contributions to regional and global security. Actions that damage this image or that portray China as a disruptive power that will
challenge or threaten international stability are viewed negatively.
Domestic Factors. An aggressive posture by the PLAN and Chinese maritime paramilitary forces against U.S. operations in China’s EEZs plays well with nationalistic elements
of the Chinese decision-making hierarchy. This can bolster the relative importance of
the PLAN in comparison with the other branches of the PLA, affording it greater opportunity in the competition for resources. Nevertheless, the PLAN also seeks to show that
it can protect China’s overseas interests and safeguard Chinese economic development
as part of the “new historic missions.” Some of these missions require cooperation with
foreign militaries, including the U.S. Navy.
Global-Commons Access. Assured access to the global economy for resources and markets is an absolute necessity for continued Chinese economic growth and development.
Given how much of China’s trade is seaborne, the PLAN is likely to place increasing
emphasis on “far seas” operations to protect China’s sea lines of communication against
a range of state and nonstate (piracy, terrorism) threats. Chinese attempts to deny the
American military access to select portions of the western Pacific air and maritime domains sets a precedent that may be applied to restrict China’s future access as well.
Escalation Control. China shares an interest in preventing dangerous air and maritime
encounters with U.S. military assets from escalating into a broader conflict, but as noted,
Chinese leaders and officers tend to regard the risk of such escalation as limited and
manageable.29 So long as Chinese decision makers view escalation risks as limited, this
factor will have limited weight in the Chinese decision-making calculus.
Relations with the United States. A constructive relationship with the United States is important for China’s continued economic development and ability to achieve its national
objectives. However, despite the damage the 2001 EP-3 incident did to bilateral relations,
Chinese civilian and military leaders tend to regard as minimal the risk of a military
incident escalating to the point where it does irreparable damage to bilateral relations.
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Alternative Futures
The importance of sovereignty and other variables detailed in the above decisionmaking model highlights a number of ways in which the Chinese policy calculus might
change over time. China’s integration into the world economy is creating new Chinese
economic interests around the world, many of them heavily dependent on uninterrupted
maritime commerce. The growing presence of PRC investment, workers, and students
around the world creates concrete interests that may be threatened by political instability or natural disasters. Chinese naval modernization efforts are also producing a larger,
more capable PLAN that is more active inside and outside the region. Over time, this
combination of expanding interests and improving capabilities may produce a considerable change in the Chinese policy calculus, including in Chinese perspectives on
maritime interactions generally and EEZ operations specifically.
One way of thinking about the potential impact of U.S.-Chinese maritime interactions is
to consider how both countries weight their political, economic, and military interests.
This approach yields a range of alternative futures for United States–China maritime
relations; we consider three illustrative examples below.
A Cooperative Maritime Future
This path would be driven by the dominance in the decision-making calculus of both
countries of political and economic issues over military issues. General alignment of
American and Chinese political and economic interests could drive both sides to establish an acceptable modus vivendi for EEZ military operations. Military concerns would
be seen as an obstacle to the more important benefits realizable through economic
and political cooperation. Eventual resolution of the EEZ issue would pave the way for
more-cooperative military-to-military relations aligned with the positive political and
economic character of the overall relationship. Four distinct cooperative relationships
are possible, depending on the degree of compatibility between American and Chinese
political and economic interests and the degree to which cooperation in these areas
shapes national security and military considerations:
•• Benign maritime partnering: American and Chinese maritime forces actively cooperate to resolve issues affecting common interests. These collaborative efforts advance
broader interests of the international community in areas such as counterpiracy
operations, humanitarian affairs and disaster relief, and commitment to keeping sea
lines of communication open. The geographic scope of such cooperation is driven by
the global distribution of Chinese interests and by the Chinese military capacity to
operate in distant regions.
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•• Assertive partnering: Similar to the option above, except that the United States and
China are much more willing to initiate cooperative actions that do not necessarily
benefit all international actors. Critics complain that U.S.-Chinese cooperation has
the look of a maritime “G-2.”
•• Limited partnering: This would involve a degree of maritime partnering significantly
lower than in the first two options. Strong economic/commercial interests compel
some form of resolution of the military EEZ operations issue, but the convergence of
political interests allows only a limited degree of maritime cooperation.
•• Passive partnering: Relatively small overlap of political and economic/commercial
interests and weak trust constrain active maritime cooperation. However, there is sufficient convergence on interests that one country “permits” unilateral actions by the
other in pursuit of its maritime objectives.
An Ambivalent Maritime Future
This future implies a more equal weighting of economic, political, and military interests
in each side’s decision-making calculus. The United States and China continue to “muddle through,” with no definitive solution to the EEZ military operations issue. Maritime
military/national-security issues between the United States and China periodically arise,
but political and economic common interests in preserving cooperation are sufficient to
keep crises in check. This future might include a geographic differentiation of maritime
interactions, with competitive dynamics dominating in the western Pacific but greater
cooperation in more-distant regions (where PLA power-projection capabilities are
greatly diminished). The fundamental question is whether this arrangement would be
politically viable over the long term. As PLA capabilities improve, the competitive aspect
prominent in the western Pacific might spread and inhibit cooperation in other areas.
The ambivalent political relationship and limited political basis for military cooperation
suggest that a major military incident could push relations in an antagonistic direction.
An Antagonistic Maritime Future
This future is one where military/national-security concerns weigh more heavily in the
decision-making calculus and common economic and political interests are insufficient
to produce cooperation. The competitive aspect of the military relationship becomes increasingly dominant, though there may be geographic variation due to the limitations of
the PLA’s global power-projection capabilities. While incentives may still exist for cooperative maritime endeavors in areas outside the western Pacific, the highly competitive
aspects of the military relationship in the waters closer to China would overwhelm them.
This could become a new “Cold War at sea” with a greatly elevated probability of crisis
escalation and heightened operational risk for both countries. In a more antagonistic
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relationship, the military necessity for the United States to conduct operations in China’s
EEZ would likely increase, despite the heightened risks of confrontation and escalation.
To the degree that the Chinese continue harassment of U.S. military forces operating in
international waters in the western Pacific, the United States might look, in conjunction
with regional allies, to pursue similar measures against PLA forces operating in the EEZs
of other states.
A cooperative maritime future likely requires the development of a United States–China
modus vivendi on the issue of EEZ operations, but a range of solutions is imaginable.
Some options might involve China converging on U.S. perspectives, as a China with
expanding global interests and a more active military sees less value in restrictions on
what militaries can do in other EEZs. A PLA officer suggested in June 2013 that China
might respond to U.S. reconnaissance activities by “sending ships and planes to the
U.S. EEZ,” acknowledging that China has already done so “a few times.”30 China’s recent
military activities within the EEZs of other countries—including naval activity around
Guam and Hawaii—suggest that Chinese naval operations are becoming more parallel
to American operations.31 It is also possible to imagine a more transparent and cooperative China, such that the United States feels less need to conduct surveillance in China’s
EEZ. The nature of the modus vivendi is likely to have a significant impact on how other
maritime powers interpret UNCLOS with respect to EEZ military operations. Chinese
compliance with more generally agreed-on norms of maritime behavior might compel
the handful of countries (especially India and Brazil) with restrictive interpretations to
modify their stances to align more closely with the interpretations held by the United
States and most other countries. Conversely, American acceptance of strong limitations
on EEZ surveillance operations may induce a broader sense of hyperterritoriality with
respect to maritime boundaries, whereby operations in any country’s EEZ are treated
in a restrictive manner akin to the regime of the territorial sea. In this case, restrictive
interpretations of UNCLOS may become more widespread, heightening the chance of
conflict between other countries.

Conclusion
The continuing pattern of dangerous U.S.-Chinese air and maritime incidents in China’s
EEZ is not the product of a lack of clear international rules and norms. Rather, it is the
result of China’s restrictive interpretation of what military activities are allowed inside its
EEZ and its willingness to violate established rules and norms to uphold that interpretation. It is not self-evident that this is a major problem. Current American operations are
not producing unacceptable levels of operational risk or causing excessive damage to
bilateral relations.
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Nevertheless, it is not clear that this tolerable status quo will continue indefinitely.
China has the ability to increase significantly the level of harassment of U.S. assets; a
“threat that leaves something to chance” may produce a collision or accident that causes
significant loss of life, with unpredictable consequences that seriously disrupt important
economic and political aspects of the relationship. Moreover, in the future China may
expand its definition of “unacceptable” military activities in ways that constrain U.S.
operations. One PLA National Defense University officer has argued that “China sees
the maritime area as part of its defensive perimeter” and “will try to stop U.S. military
operations that it views as a threat to its national security.”32 Conversely, if China follows
the Soviet pattern—which is by no means guaranteed—its expanded naval capabilities
and operational deployments may eventually produce more parallelism in intelligence
operations and greater interest in reducing operational risks through mutual restraint.
China’s April 2013 proposal to establish U.S.-Chinese working groups on military
confidence-building measures produced a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on
“rules of behavior for safety of air and maritime encounters,” announced by President
Xi and President Barack Obama in November 2014. The MOU draws on international
rules including UNCLOS, COLREGs, CUES, and ICAO; calls for an annual assessment
meeting under the MMCA to exchange papers on operational safety and review air and
maritime encounters; and is designed to include annexes governing surface-to-surface
encounters (approved in 2014) and air-to-air encounters (to be approved in 2015).33 The
bilateral agreement is a good step forward, but the test will be where and how consistently the PLA applies these rules. If China tries to define all its EEZ claims as “territorial
waters” and the PLA operates by the agreed rules only on the high seas or in the EEZs of
other countries, the agreement will be unlikely to have much positive effect in stabilizing
U.S.-Chinese relations.
Regardless of how the United States and China ultimately resolve their dispute over operations in EEZs and which alternate maritime future emerges, it is clear that American
and Chinese actions and maritime interactions will help shape broader rules and norms
of maritime behavior. This raises the question whether a restrictive interpretation of
permissible EEZ operations is really in China’s best interest. Are the short-term, tactical
benefits that might be realized worth the long-term strategic costs that may be incurred?
Even leaving aside the potential for a military incident or accident that damages longterm Sino-U.S. relations, it is not clear that a stronger China with global economic and
security interests should favor restrictive rules on military operations inside EEZs.
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